Disability
and Institutional Change: A
Human Variation Perspective on Overcoming Oppression
Kay Schriner,
University of Arkansas, and Richard K. Scotch,
University of Texas‑Dallas
Journal of Disability Policy Studies
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2, Fall 2001
Copyright © PRO-ED, Inc.
Reprinted with permission
For at least three decades,
disability rights activists have challenged exclusionary and stigmatizing
social processes that constrain people with disabilities, an effort
highlighted by the 1990 enactment Of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
However, all environmental barriers to participation by people with
disabilities may not be eliminated by a policy strategy that focuses on
discrimination and fails to address many forms of oppression that do not
fall under legal definitions of discrimination. The human variation model of
disability defines disability as the systematic mismatch between physical
and mental attributes of individuals and the present (but not the
potential) ability of social institutions to accommodate those attributes.
Although rights‑based approaches remain necessary to overcome the barriers
facing many Americans with disabilities' a policy strategy that builds on a
human variation approach may further efforts to eliminate disability
oppression.
The
effectiveness of any strategy for addressing the current status of
Americans with disabilities depends on identifying the nature of the
problems they face. Different conceptions of the problem are necessarily
linked to different solutions, either through legally imposed remedies or
through broader social and political action (Hahn, 1985b). For example, a
medical model of disability typically views the disadvantage associated with
having disability as inherent in an individual's impairment; the solution
to this problem is individual rehabilitation or, when necessary, income
support to compensate for the disabled individual's inability to function.
For over three decades,
disability rights activists and organizations linked to the disability
rights and independent living movements have challenged exclusionary and
stigmatizing social processes that constrain people with disabilities (Barnartt,
Schriner, & Scotch, in press). According to the ideology underlying these
protests, disability is defined in sociopolitical terms, identifying
barriers faced by people with disabilities as imposed and subject to change,
rather than intrinsically linked to the presence of an impairment (Hahn,
1985b). Disability rights activists have rejected the assumption that having
a disability inevitably means that someone is unable to live independently
or participate in everyday economic, political, or social life, an
assumption that has become a self‑fulfilling prophecy embedded in employment
practices, the design and operation of public accommodations, and
incentives in public benefit systems.
The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA; see Note) characterizes the disadvantaged
social and economic position of people with disabilities through a
sociopolitical lens in which individuals who have physical or mental
impairments face stigmatization, exclusion, and marginalization and because
of assumptions about incapacity that are embedded in a wide variety of
cultural, organizational, and physical manifestations (Hahn, 1985a). One key
rationale for the ADA was that many of the problems associated with having a
disability were not inevitable products of impairment, but rather were the
result of a socially constructed environment that arbitrarily and
perniciously excluded or limited social participation. The social
environment determines the extent to which an impairment results in
incapacity or exclusion from mainstream social processes, rather than merely
the impairment itself. Assumptions about normality of human functioning
become built into technology, architecture, spatial organization, and
institutional processes. These physical and social structures become
reinforced by social belief and cultural expression.
Thus the social environment
has enforced the social isolation and dependency of people with
disabilities, substantially limiting participation. Until recently,
building construction standards did not allow for wheelchair access, and
public programs contained assumptions about minimum mobility needed for
participation. Communication technologies still require certain levels of
visual and hearing acuity. Almost invariably, these arrangements are not
inextricably linked to the nature of the activity involved, but rather
represent choices that are often arbitrary, and once made, become
institutionalized and difficult to challenge without a commitment to
change.
Some of the experiences and
characteristics of people with disabilities are like those of other groups
commonly recognized as minorities, such as racial and ethnic minorities,
women, or gays and lesbians. These groups are subject to prejudiced
attitudes, discriminatory behavior, and institutional and legal constraints
that parallel those experienced by African Americans and other disadvantaged
and excluded groups. People with disabilities are victimized by negative
stereotypes of dependence and incapacity associated with discriminatory
attitudes and practices that result in exclusion and social isolation.
Disabled people may lack access to employment, public facilities, voting,
and other forms of civic involvement due to barriers of stigma, fear, and
disabling assumptions, and thus are denied the opportunity to participate
fully in society (Hahn, 1985a).
Social
Institutions and Oppression
The conditions affecting
people with disabilities are not static, and the disadvantages imposed by
these conditions are not immutable. Changes in employment practices, social
attitudes, or the built environment may begin to remedy existing
disadvantages for some individuals with impairments but may impose them on
others. Some social trends appear to favor greater inclusion of people with
disabilities. Technological changes, activism by the disability rights and
independent living movements, and policies that have promoted greater
public participation have helped to give people with disabilities more
visibility, and have advanced public understanding of the experience of
disability. Nevertheless, people with disabilities are still
disproportionately unemployed and underemployed, and their incomes are
below those of people without disabilities (Bruyere, 2000). For example,
despite the ADA, the employment situation faced by most persons with
disabilities has not improved in the past decade, and labor force
participation by working‑age persons with disabilities has declined since
the early 1990s (Schwochau & Blanck, 2000). Older disabled individuals and
disabled people of color have particularly low levels of work force
participation, reflecting general trends in the economy for middle‑aged and
minority workers (Yelin, 1992).
More disconcerting for the
future, the below‑average educational attainment of people with disabilities
makes them vulnerable to labor market trends in the emerging knowledgebased
economy that favor high levels of education and technical training (Scotch
& Schriner, 1997). Many people with disabilities also are discouraged from
seeking employment by persistent work disincentives built into benefit and
insurance programs and by inadequate systems of social support (National
Council on Disability [NCD], 1996). Inadequate health insurance coverage for
chronic conditions creates barriers to employment, as do difficulties with
transportation (NCD, 1996). Although policy initiatives such as the 1999
Work Incentives Improvement Act are first steps in reducing such barriers,
we believe they have only modest potential for expanding workforce
participation for most disabled people.
As one of the most
vulnerable groups in the labor force, people with disabilities also may be
affected by the economic turbulence associated with globalization, rapid
technological change, geographic displacement, and Web‑based economic
activity. Heightened competition, continuing deregulation, and the growth
of the service sector have led to ongoing changes in work relationships, job
longevity, and the organizational, geographic, and spatial settings in which
work is done (Scotch & Schriner, 1997). These changes present many
opportunities for entrepreneurship, telecommuting, and nonstandard forms of
employment among individuals with disabilities, such as those with mobility
or communication‑related impairments.
However, they also
represent heightened risk for disruption in employment that some people with
disabilities may find particularly difficult due to general lack of economic
resources and their reliance on interpersonal and community systems of
support. The social isolation experienced by many people with disabilities
may create difficulties in adjustment to the culture of work. Although new
technologies may deemphasize working in adjacent space, the increasing
interconnectedness and "just‑in‑time" nature of many work tasks may limit
the flexibility of work scheduling, and this may have consequences for
individuals with certain physical and mental impairments. For example
(according to an anonymous corporate executive), one prominent
high‑technology firm routinely expects employees to engage in so‑called
"death marches" at the final stage of product development that require a
sustained intensity of around‑ the‑ clock effort that may be incompatible
with certain needed accommodations (personal communication, September 10,
1999).
The work‑related challenges
raised by rapid and complex economic and social change exemplify the
shifting circumstances that can pose barriers to equal participation of
people with disabilities. The disadvantages faced by individuals with
disabilities are inherent in a combination of factors that affect different
people differently. Overtly discriminatory conduct and associated attitudes
are only one element in the disadvantaged employment situation for many
people with disabilities, for which anti‑discrimination laws such as the
ADA are only one part of the solution.
Although overt
discrimination remains widespread and pernicious, the commonly held notion
of discrimination must be so stretched to include the various barriers faced
by people with disabilities that the concept loses some of its precision and
thus its utility as a guide to policy. The nature of disadvantage faced by
people with disabilities is so pervasive and, in many instances, the
unintended consequence of routine or novel practices, that the concept of
discrimination is insufficient to encompass these processes and effects. It
may be useful for public policy to focus broadly on the systematic failure
of social institutions to accommodate the human variation represented among
people with disabilities, regardless of whether that failure might be
considered to be the result of discrimination. Where disability‑based
disadvantage is widespread and systematic in a social institution,
occurring and recurring in constantly changing relationships and
arrangements, it might be characterized as oppression.
Disability
and Institutional Change
The ADA is based primarily
upon the minority group model of disability. Legislatively, it is built upon
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination on the bases
of race, religion, and gender, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. The ADA was intended to eliminate through established civil rights
remedies to discrimination the marginalization of people with disabilities.
In the conceptual foundation of the ADA, failure to provide accommodation
that enables social, economic, and political participation is characterized
as discrimination, whether it is the result of deliberate animus or of
institutional practices that constructively block participation without a
reasonable rationale. Conversely, equity is equated with elimination of
discrimination, often through provision of reasonable accommodation.
The political and legal
limitations of the ADA now being realized are due in part to differences
between disability and other statuses, such as race and gender, which are
associated with social and economic disadvantage. In order to eliminate
discrimination based on race, a color‑blind standard of nondiscrimination is
achievable (although the goal will be achieved sooner through affirmative
action, which has been proposed as a remedy to past discrimination). A
disability blind standard will not eliminate discrimination against people
with disabilities, because it is typically necessary to recognize the
disability in order to accommodate it.
Further, it is not necessary
to distinguish among various subgroups among racial minorities. Similarly,
there are a limited range of legitimate circumstances in which gender
conscious remedies for discrimination may be necessary (Brandwein & Scotch,
in press), and these fail to require subtle distinctions among subgroups
within the protected class of women. Yet, the diversity of physical and
mental impairments and their consequences for function require recognition
of different categories of disabilities (e.g., blindness, deafness,
mobility, mental, emotional.)
If disability discrimination
were directly analogous to racial and gender discrimination, it would be
technically, if not politically, easy to identify and eliminate. Because of
the diversity of disabling conditions and the variety of coping strategies
of individuals who have them, however, many accommodations under the ADA
must be tailored to the individual involved, and may require periodic
alterations to reflect changes in the individual's impairment or changes in
the environment in and outside of the workplace. Accommodating people with
disabilities may require an ongoing willingness to change; the restructuring
of expectations, tasks, and techniques; and a constructive communication
between persons with disabilities and those responsible for their
environments such as employers.
The concept of disability
represents a wide and diverse variety of conditions, each with its own
idiosyncrasies that may require unique accommodations. To be effective,
accommodations may even need to differ for different individuals with
similar impairments. Some deaf people may require sign language
interpretation, whereas others may not. Some blind people read Braille,
others do not. And because impairments are rarely constant over time,
individuals may require varying accommodations over the course of their
employment.
Although there are
occasionally individual difficulties to be worked out, racial and gender
discrimination can typically be eliminated through "wholesale" changes in
policy and practice. The ADA, however, must be implemented primarily at the
"retail" level of individually crafted solutions to problems of
accessibility. According to past experience, most accommodations are easily
achievable and involve only modest costs (Bruyere, 2000). Nevertheless, the
transaction costs to identify and negotiate such changes may be considerable
for those institutions that traditionally have been procedurally rigid and
unresponsive to employee or customer needs. If one accepts the premise that
the elimination of disability discrimination requires providing reasonable
opportunities appropriate to each individual's circumstances, then some
fundamental institutional changes may be required.
If the logic underlying the
ADA is followed to its conclusion, the Act would require that workplaces,
public facilities, and the infrastructures that support them
institutionalize flexibility and responsiveness to individualized needs.
This would require a long‑term transformation that would be beneficial to
people with disabilities and many others. It would also require a commitment
of effort beyond other civil rights mandates of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. To what extent can the ADA promote humane, responsive,
and individuated environments in work and public life?
Disability community
advocates had hoped that the ADA would be an important step in redefining
how disability is constructed in public policy, and ultimately in public
life. A decade after its enactment, the direct impact of the ADA on
discriminatory practices remains unclear. Although a tremendous effort was
made to educate affected parties about the Act, many employers and providers
of public accommodation have been slow to respond to its mandates (NCD,
1996). Although some of this delayed response may have been due to the
perceived ambiguity of several statutory provisions, many affected
entities appear to have continued to resist any changes promoted by the ADA
(Russell, 2000). Of course it is impossible to assess how many proactive
initiatives have been taken in the absence of direct legal duress. It is
clear that many employers and providers of public accommodation have made
their facilities more accessible, and there appears to be a public
commitment to ensuring access.
There is some good news in
that the systematic transformation envisioned in the ADA is consistent with
other workplace and societal trends and more easily achieved with emerging
technologies. There are multiple pressures on social institutions to
accommodate the range of individual needs, increasing the likelihood that
individuals with disabilities will be accommodated as well. Labor shortages
in high technology industries have led many employers to create more humane
and supportive workplaces. Corporate concierge services, flexible working
hours, on‑site childcare and retail services, and the promotion. (or at
least toleration) of telecommuting are not qualitatively different from the
kinds of accommodations needed by many disabled workers. As employees and
communities increasingly demand family‑friendly workplaces, they will find
it conceptually similar to offer disability‑friendly workplaces as well.
Such changes were not, and
likely could not, be forced by legal protections against disability‑based
discrimination. An antidiscrimination strategy using the ADA, therefore,
cannot serve as a sufficient policy basis for promoting participation by
people with disabilities. It may be more useful to look beyond
discrimination in addressing the needs of such individuals.
Although eliminating
discrimination is necessary to promote the empowerment of people with
disabilities, it falls short of offering a comprehensive approach to the
development of policy solutions to the problems associated with
disability. The goal of expanding participation will require efforts on
multiple fronts. An antidiscrimination strategy does not provide adequate
guidance in developing cost‑effective, politically defendable policies that
meet the employment and other needs of people with disabilities.
Disability
and Human Rights
Given
the uniquely American history of civil rights discourse and policymaking,
framing the concerns of people with disabilities in terms of equal
protection/equal opportunity calculations‑until recently‑has been
politically both promising and palatable. But now, with the court's limited
understanding and occasional hostility to the ADA, and a less reliable
political environment, it may be necessary to reevaluate the theories and
discourse on which the ADA is based.
One attractive alternative
for policy debates is based on human rights theories, which seek to
establish positive rights to economic, social, and political justice for
all. These theories are very broadly conceived; indeed, they are the
broadest of all approaches to defining equality for persons with
disabilities and other disadvantaged groups. They are implicitly based on an
understanding of oppression by encompassing the various forms of potential
disadvantage that governments and other social institutions can impose.
Human rights theories go beyond negative rights by establishing minimal
criteria for achieving social, political, and economic equality.
Human rights
theories are multifaceted, addressing rights ranging from political and
civil rights to cultural, social, and economic rights and serve as the basis
for various documents of the United Nations. For example, the University
Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976), are broad statements concerning
the rights of individuals to these categories of rights with profound
implications for governing the relationships between states and their
citizens. Each elevates the individual's rights to a high plane and thus
creates potential claims on governments to adopt policies that promote
equality of opportunity and results. These instruments establish an
international commitment to democratic governance, strong civil societies,
and social justice. Although the potential import of these commitments is
still unrealized in most countries, the moral imperative they represent is
significant.
Several United Nations
documents already have targeted the needs of people with disabilities,
including the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons,
the 1975 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, and the recently
developed Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons
with Disabilities (Degener & KosterDreese, 1995).
Human rights theories have
been a galvanizing moral force in countries around the world in establishing
standards for promoting democracy, social and economic development, and
individual rights. Many nations, particularly those established since 1948,
include parts or all of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in their
constitutions (United Nations, 1995). Yet, the full force of human rights
theories is far from being realized for a variety of cultural, political,
and economic reasons. In many parts of the world, the realities of tradition
and economic pressures impose impediments to progress.
As with many good and proper
ends, constructing the conditions in which human rights are ensured for all
has proven difficult. This is just as true for people with disabilities as
other historically oppressed groups. The disadvantages imposed by modern
public‑sector bureaucracies and economic arrangements in the private sector
are entrenched and stubborn. In any scenario, these disadvantages will not
be removed without fundamental social change of the sort that threatens
powerful interests.
In this respect, human
rights theories are as potentially limited as the antidiscrimination
theories on which the ADA rests, although in different ways. The ADA's
limitations arise from the legal and political resistance to stretching the
discrimination definition as far as necessary to address disability‑based
disadvantage. In human rights theories, disadvantage is the result of
oppressive structures and practices (which also oppress other groups).
Compared with anti discrimination theories, the breadth of analysis
available using human rights theories permits a more systemic and far
reaching critique of the political and economic sphere.
Also, compared with
antidiscrimination theories, there would be even greater resistance to
implementing policies based on human rights theories. This is the issue that
advocates for people with disabilities will have to face. No matter what
theory of equality and definitions of oppression are relied on, it must be
recognized that the public and its political and legal establishments seldom
enthusiastically embrace the idea of remedying the inequities that exist in
American society. This is especially true with respect to class issues,
which are at the core of many disability issues. Poverty and its
consequences have not been a centerpiece of political discourse for many
years, and when poverty is discussed, it is usually in terms of "extending
the prosperity," not adjusting the structural characteristics that
continuously sort the winners from the losers. Although there are clearly
avenues for socioeconomic advancement (and many individuals who benefit
from them), without the political will to keep pursuing more equitable
outcomes for America's disadvantaged populations, disability policy is not
likely to have a significant effect on the quality of life for people with
disabilities in this country.
Even when disability policy
protects the subsistence rights of people with disabilities (as in
disability insurance schemes that provide an income floor and at least
minimal health‑care benefits), it does so at the discretion of the
legislature. The "deserving poor" are usually offered this assistance, but
those who are not considered deserving may not be. In fact, the current
legislative and judicial stance toward more subsistence rights is often
hostile or at least resistant. The federal entitlement to welfare for poor
families (among which are many individuals with disabilities) was abolished
in the most recent Congress, and the bill was signed into law by a
Democratic president. Before that, the Supreme Court's hostility to
subsistence rights spanned the terms of the liberal Chief Justice Earl
Warren and the conservative Chief Justice William Rehnquist (Bussiere,
1997).
More expansive benefits, and
access to the education and social and rehabilitation services that many
people with disabilities need to take advantage of the opportunities
available to them, maybe more vulnerable than the historically minimal
social insurance programs available to people with disabilities. Further,
requirements for accommodating individuals with disabilities in the private
sector continue to be resisted by business interests, and it seems unlikely
that the legislature and the courts will take decisive action to strengthen
their application. Such initiatives require public investments and private
obligations at odds with traditional U.S. notions of individualism,
property rights, and limited government.
This analysis suggests that
disability rights advocates and other interested parties face substantial
challenges in addressing the inequalities that affect the ability of people
with disabilities to participate fully in American society. It may be that
human rights theories will offer some promise in this effort. However, we
would like to suggest that even a successful rights‑oriented strategy would
fall short of creating the substantive equality of participation sought by
the disability rights movement. Although creating formal claims on equity
regardless of impairment is important and worth pursuing, the nature of
environmental adaptation required to accommodate people with disabilities
may be best achieved through an approach based on a different conceptual
model, such as the human variation model we have proposed (Scotch & Schriner,
1997).
Disability
as Human Variation
In the
human variation model, disability is defined situationally as a mismatch
between physical and mental attributes and the present (but not the
potential) ability of social institutions to incorporate those attributes.
Institutions affected are those involved in economic, social, cultural, and
political life, such as the family, the community, the economy, and the
polity. Included are organizations that provide employment, education,
health care, transportation and communication, and the full range of public
services.
By focusing attention on how
systems respond to the variation introduced by disability, a new model of
disability might help us address issues of how to design institutional
responses to such variation. Such a human variation model assumes that
within any population, physical and mental attributes vary. Disability
occurs where the environment within which an individual is situated can only
accommodate a limited range of characteristics. Thus, some environments
demand from individuals the capacity to read print, climb stairs, or work
for eight hours without a break, and those individuals who lack that
capacity are defined as disabled.
Certain environments are
associated with high levels of disability because of their physical design
or their institutional rules and routines which have the effect of limiting
participation. In some cases, such restrictions are intrinsic to the
essential functions of the work or other activity that is being taking
place, and in those cases they may be unavoidable. For example, given the
current nature of transportation technology, a certain level of visual
acuity is necessary to operate a transit bus or an airplane. However, in
many other cases, alternative strategies for accomplishing the same tasks
may be available. In those cases, restrictions on participation by a person
with an impairment may be fairly arbitrary, and the failure to adopt the
alternative might be seen as oppressive. The position of copyeditor, for
example, may be inaccessible to a blind person if text is only available in
print, yet completely accessible with the now virtually costless conversion
of print to electronic text that is readily readable by that same person.
The concept of universal
design suggests the creation of environments that can accommodate the needs
of virtually any individual, regardless of impairment (Zola, 1989).
According to this conception, the problems faced by people with disabilities
might be seen as the consequences of the failure of social institutions (and
their physical and cultural manifestations) that can be attributed to
having been constructed to deal with a narrower range of variation than is
in fact present among any given population). Thus, those individuals whose
mobility, communication, vision, cognition, or medical needs differ from
social norms find themselves confronting institutions not well suited for
their abilities and potential.
Historically, all societies
have adapted to some types of human variation while demanding adjustment of
some or marginalizing others, and there is evidence that this
marginalization has increased with industrialization and urbanization (Scheer
& Groce, 1988). To the extent that society fully accommodates a condition,
it ceases to be a disability as defined under the human variation model.
Social systems embodying universal design minimize the relevance of
impairments at relatively low social or economic cost.
For some individuals and
some impairments, discrepancies will persist between individual attributes
and the requirements of even universally designed systems. However, where
the compatibility between individual variation and societal institutions is
limited or strained, secondary effects may ripple through family and
community systems as ad hoc or partial adaptations are made, exacting
financial, time, and emotional costs from those involved. These customized
solutions often involve considerable complexity, due to the institutional
inertia of unresponsive systems not geared to generic accommodation.
Building on this perspective
of disability as human variation, disability can be viewed as introducing
complexity and disequilibrium into individual lives, family relationships,
and the various social systems in which people live, learn, play, and work.
When a child is born with a severe impairment, for example, more complex
support systems may be required to support the child and her family.
Additional resources and new approaches to the challenges of daily life may
need to be developed because economic, social, and cultural systems are not
geared to the needs of the child and the family. In instances where systems
have incorporated routinized mechanisms for meeting needs that are
associated with different disabilities, systemic strain may never occur, nor
will the conflict that can accompany such strain.
Like the sociopolitical
model, a conception of disability based on variation highlights and rejects
the assumption that stigma and incapacity are inherent to impairment or that
disability is solely an individual‑level attribute. However, the emphasis
of the sociopolitical model on discrimination and discrimination‑focused
remedies means that the model is of limited help in guiding needed reforms
of medical, educational, and human service delivery systems to best promote
independence and full social participation by people with disabilities
(Batavia & Shriner, in press). By characterizing all barriers faced by
people with physical and mental impairments as discrimination, we risk
trivializing the still prevalent and often vicious stereotyping and
exclusive discriminatory practices by confounding them with the general
incapacity of social systems to respond to individual variation.
Disability‑related
oppression, whether associated with animus and intentional discrimination or
not, requires a social response. Many people with disabilities have
problems in functioning that will not disappear if prejudice and
discrimination are eliminated and may require long‑term individualized
accommodations that some would question as being justified by the policy
goal of nondiscrimination.
Even where productivity for
individual firms may be limited by adaptations required for universal
design and universal access, society must broadly consider the social costs
(i.e., externalities) imposed by narrow conceptions of the need for
short‑term profitability by individual firms. Independence and full social
participation of people with disabilities entail important multiple gains to
society at large, gains that easily justify investment in systems that
promote inclusion (Bowe, 1980). Focusing exclusively on discrimination
limits our attention to the actions and cost‑benefit calculations of
individual employers. Focusing on inclusion and universal policies requires
cooperative efforts within communities and society at large, broadening the
resources that can legitimately be brought to bear on fostering inclusion.
Similarly, a reliance on
human rights theories that insist on confronting entrenched economic and
political interests raises the possibility that people with disabilities
will not be accommodated to the extent necessary because of political
resistance to positive rights claims. Here again, arguing for required
changes may be more profitable if done from a more cooperative and inclusive
stance of universality.
We believe that rights‑based
approaches prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability remain
necessary to overcome the barriers facing many Americans with disabilities,
but that such approaches cannot by themselves lead us to a society in which
all people with disabilities will have full opportunities for
participation. The human variation may help us to identify further
strategies for achieving the goal of integration and suggest how a society
would look in which disability was not defined inherently as a handicapping
condition. But achieving that goal may be more feasible within a general
strategy of working for more responsive institutions, not just on behalf of
people with disabilities, but on behalf of everyone. This task may be too
daunting to be undertaken by the disability community alone. Now more than
ever, the opportunity for overcoming the oppression experienced by many
people with disabilities lies in the forging of strong, mutually beneficial
alliances with others who analyze the problems they face in the same way as
do people with disabilities.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Kay
Schriner,
PhD, is research fellow in the Fulbright Institute on International
Relations and research professor in the Department of Political Science at
the University of Arkansas, where she conducts research on the political
participation of people with disabilities, disability in American
elections, and the human variation model of disability. She has been
designated a Distinguished Switzer Fellow by the National Institute on
Disability and Rehabilitation and is the founding editor of the Journal
of Disability Policy Studies. Address: Kay Schriner, Fulbright Institute
of International Relations, 722 W. Maple, University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville, AR 72701 (e‑mail: kays@comp. uark.edu).
Richard K. Scotch,
PhD, is professor of sociology and political economy in the School of
Social Sciences at the University of Texas at Dallas. He is past president
of the Society for Disability Studies and the author of numerous works
concerning the reform of disability and social policy. A new edition of his
book From Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability
Policy is being published in 2001 by Temple University Press. Address:
Richard K. Scotch, School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas,
Box 830688, Richardson, TX 75083‑0688 (e‑mail: scotch@utdallas.edu).
AUTHORS' NOTES
I.An earlier version of
this paper was presented in the Thematic Session "Recognizing Oppression and
Facilitating Change: Demystifying Disability" at the Annual Meeting of the
American Sociological Association in Washington, DC, on August 14, 2000.
2. We would like to express
our appreciation to Drew Batavia for his comments as the paper was being
revised.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
The ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990.
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