

# A Paradigm for Evaluation of the Federal-State Vocational Rehabilitation Program

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In recent years, the unemployment level of people with disabilities has received increased attention. A number of federal agencies, public policy makers, consumer groups, and professionals have focused significant attention on why the unemployment rate for persons with disabilities remains so high. This unemployment rate has hovered in the 70% range for decades. Additionally, Hunt, Habeck, Owens and Vandergoot (1996) suggest that the real economic cost of disability, the lost production from individuals not at work, has been growing rapidly in recent years. Chelius, Galvin, & Owens (1992) also report that employers have been paying 8% of payroll for disability related expenses. Unfortunately, advances such as assistive technology (Flippo, Inge, & Barcus, 1995), health interventions, (Becker, Drake, et al., 1997), job coaches (Wehman, Gibson, Brooke, & Johnson, 1998; Wehman, Revell, & Kregel, 1998), natural supports (e.g., Test & Wood, 1996), new training techniques (Moon, Inge, Wehman, et al., 1990), and progressive legislation (e.g., ADA-PL 101-336), all of which were designed to ease the entry of people with disabilities into the competitive workplace, have not resulted in a significant improvement in employment rates for people with disabilities.

A recent national survey of adults with disabilities conducted by the National Organization on Disability (NOD) in collaboration with the Louis Harris & Associates has presented new and challenging data on the current employment picture for persons with disabilities. The NOD/Harris survey of 1,000 adults with disabilities was conducted in the Spring of 1998. They found that only 29% of working-age persons with disabilities were employed (full- or part-time), as compared to 79% of non-disabled persons. The NOD/Harris 1998 survey is the third of a series, begun in 1986 and repeated again in 1994. This series of surveys captures the evolving employment experiences of persons with disabilities over time. Strikingly, despite the passage of four years since the complete implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the aim of which was to remove barriers to full participation in society, respondents to the 1998 survey reported lower employment rates (29%, down from 34% in 1986), less engaging jobs (46% used "full talents," down from 66% in 1994), and lower life satisfaction (33% reported "very satisfied," down from 39% in 1986) than the respondents of previous surveys (NOD/Harris, 1998).

Moreover, when the experiences of the respondents to the 1986, 1994, and 1998 surveys are compared to those of their non-disabled contemporaries, the gap in their experiences becomes clear. The respondents with disabilities have suffered from consistently lower relative income levels (22% more disabled in very low income levels) and lower levels of education (11-12% fewer high school graduates). Additionally, persons with disabilities continue to have greater transportation and accessibility concerns than their non-disabled peers, although these appear to be less pressing than in previous years.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the number of working age people with disabilities who receive Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits from the Social Security Administration increased from

4 million in 1985 to 6.3 million in 1994 (General Accounting Office, June 1996). These figures are alarming because of the enormous expenditures associated with long term receipt of Social Security cash benefits. This figure has now risen to 8 million Americans receiving 89 billion dollars in FY 1997 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Census, 1997).

In order to combat this rising social problem of disability and unemployment, there has been the development of greatly improved employer accommodations, rehabilitation interventions, and medical treatments, all of which play an increasingly large role in the implementation of work supports for workers with disabilities (e.g., Wehman & Kregel, 1998). There has been in the past decade a significant amount of time, money, and thought devoted toward studying how these types of accommodations can be utilized to support persons with disabilities and their employers (Barbour, 1999; Wehman, Targett, Eltzeroth, Green, Brooke, & Barcus, 1999). The common link between accommodation, intervention, and treatment is the idea of **support** as opposed to cure or remediate. Over the years, a key philosophical change has been the substantial paradigm shift from a clinic or center-based approach of “curing” persons with disabilities to instead that of supporting them with a customized array of resources designed by the employer, worker, and often times the rehabilitation provider (Brown, Farrington, Suomi, Ziegler, & Knight, 1999).

Support has been recognized by the public sector as well as the private sector as a key variable in promoting job retention (Pendergrast & Storey, 1999; McHugh, Storey, & Certo, in press). For example, ongoing supports, as defined in the amended regulations of the Rehabilitation Act (Federal Register, June 24, 1992, p. 28438), are those needed to support and maintain an individual with severe disabilities in supported employment. Supports differ for each individual and vary widely in type and intensity for the duration of employment (Hansen, 1999). Supports are initiated from a variety of sources and can be provided by the employer, coworkers, rehabilitation professionals, and family members. In recent years, the trend has been to move toward the most natural support or support provided by the employer or available at the workplace (e.g., Test & Wood, 1996; Wehman, 2001). Business accommodations are supports usually initiated by the business; on the other hand, rehabilitation interventions tend to be driven by external agencies or persons. This second approach is supported employment and has been highly consistent with disability management practice in business and industry. When a worker is injured, helping that individual return to work quickly and with whatever support is necessary is seen as valuable (Hunt, 1996). Supports are one way to assist people with disabilities to become more independent and exercise control in the direction of their lives. The chart below shows a classification of just a few of the types of workplace supports that have been developed and utilized successfully in the past 15 years.

<b>Business Accommodations</b>	<b>Rehabilitation Interventions</b>	<b>Treatments</b>	<b>Public Policy Protection &amp; Supports</b>
Transitional Work Early Return to Work Programs	Job Coaching Supported Employment	Medications Medical Interventions	Americans with Disabilities Act
Disability Case Management	Assistive Technology	Behavioral Health Cognitive Therapy	Social Security Work Incentives
Employee Assistance Programs Wellness	Compensatory Strategies Accommodation	Psychotherapy Counseling	Employer Tax Credit

One way of implementing these supports to help persons with disabilities go to work is through the support of the federal-state vocational rehabilitation program (Dunn & Growick, 2000; Gilbride, 2000). In every state in the

country there are rehabilitation counselors who help to provide case management services. The federal-state VR program has traditionally been the gateway for many persons with disabilities to access employment services. This program has been in place for decades.

Unfortunately, there have been a significant number of criticisms of the vocational rehabilitation program (e.g., Bevilacqua, 1999; Noble, 1998; Noble, Honberg, Hall, & Flynn, 1999; Weaver, 1994; General Accounting Office, 1991). Many professionals feel that the impact of vocational rehabilitation services is not wide ranging enough to sufficiently help people with disabilities, especially those with significant disabilities or who are SSA beneficiary claimants. For example, Salkever (1994) has conducted an analysis of vocational rehabilitation programs nationally. He notes:

“The historic focus of VR programs on employment outcomes is consistent with a tendency to allocate available services to clients perceived as having the greatest likelihood of finding employment following their rehabilitation. Thus, clients receiving services will tend to be less severely disabled than those not receiving services. In the past several decades, however, this tendency of VR agencies to “cream,” that is, to provide more services to persons requesting services with less severe disabilities and fewer or no services to persons with the most severe disabilities, has been of concern to federal policymakers (Shafer, 1988). While the historic focus of the program on employment outcomes has been maintained, several important pieces of recent federal legislation are aimed at discouraging “creaming” and increasing receipt of VR services by persons with severe disabilities.” (p. 46)

These criticisms have continued to foster extensive discussion pertaining to the efficacy of vocational rehabilitation and the viability of the program’s employment outcome. It is evident that what is needed is a circumspect analysis of VR’s impacts. Since its conception in 1920, there has been a long history of economic evaluation of the Federal-State VR program (Worrall, 1988). These studies have concentrated on identifying the impact of VR-service provision on participant’s (primarily earnings-related) outcomes. Unfortunately, much of this analysis has been hampered by data limitations and flawed methods (Berkowitz, 1988).

In an effort to obtain more definitive results, the U.S. Department of Education contracted with Berkeley Planning Associates (BPA) in 1986 to assess the feasibility of conducting an impact study of the VR program. The BPA report (BPA, 1988) reviewed numerous research design options for a comprehensive evaluation of the federal-state VR program. This report detailed the numerous legal and ethical concerns with implementing a randomized controlled experiment of VR impacts and ultimately concluded such an approach was infeasible. The report then provided a detailed summary of the limitations and advantages of alternative design options based on quasi-experimental methodologies involving different comparison groups, drawn from both within and outside the VR program and suggested that a national study be conducted based on numerous evaluations using comparison groups.

In 1988 a conference which included experts in VR, evaluation methodology, and benefit-cost analysis was convened to critique the design recommended by BPA to evaluate the federal VR program. The BPA analysis and a summary statement by the conference participants (Pelavin, 1989) noted the following issues for any VR evaluation.

- “The major threat to internal validity in quasi-experimental evaluations of employment and training programs is selection” (BPA, in Pelavin (1989), page A-4). It is imperative that efforts be made to correct for this issue of “selection bias” when using comparison rather than control groups.

(continued)

- “A fundamental problem with modeling selection with existing R300/911 national data tapes is that the clients are gathered together by fiscal year of closure, whereas the analysis requires that clients be grouped by time of entry/referral” (BPA, in Pelavin (1989), page C-12).
- A circumspect analysis should incorporate “a process study of the services and the context of these services, that demonstrate the nature, scope, and frequency of services” (Summary Statement, in Pelavin (1989), page 3).
- “Regardless of the model used, attention must be given to local context and to the nature of the disabling condition being served (Summary Statement, in Pelavin (1989), page 3).

Additionally, the following astute observation was made about the notion of conducting a national impact evaluation of VR. “The VR “program” is really a set of programs at the state level... And further, even within a state there are lots of separate sub-programs for separate clientele groups. All of these considerations suggest that it is pointless to do one national benefit-cost (BC) study of the VR program. There is not one program to evaluate, and nobody would pay attention to the results even if there were. What should be done instead is to do a series of BC studies, in selective states, for the particular subprograms or even those subprograms for particular clientele groups. The results would then be applicable to the particular states, which are the relevant decision-makers, and for the particular subprograms. States could then use the results to expand or contract these particular subprograms, in general or for particular clienteles. In such a way the results of the BC study could be used to guide marginal expansions or contractions of the programs in ways that seem justified by underlying economic efficiency considerations” (Gramlich, in Pelavin (1989), page 2).

Clearly, what is required is a paradigm for evaluating the impact of the vocational rehabilitation program and the employment outcomes associated with it that incorporates these suggestions. It is essential that a scientific approach be developed to analyze the outcomes. Therefore, it is the purpose of this monograph is to suggest an analytical framework for assessing employment outcomes for persons with disabilities who have been served by the federal state VR programs in one mid-Atlantic state. Specifically, we will look at longitudinal earning profiles and service costs for over 4,000 VR clients matched to their wage records drawn from the state employment service commission. Through analysis of the data we will construct a template of how to evaluate the vocational rehabilitation outcomes associated with selected workplace supports and service cost.

This template carefully incorporates the recommendations of the Design Critique Conference listed above. It first provides an overview of analyses to control for selection bias in evaluations of VR and suggests using an “internal” comparison group of program dropouts as the basis for estimating earnings gains for the participating VR “treatment” group. The subsequent analysis is then based on a cohort of applicants (not closures) for VR services in the state of Virginia in fiscal year 1988. Service costs are obtained for all VR episodes from 1988 through 2000. In addition to presenting the standard demographic and socio-economic characteristics of this applicant cohort, this analysis provides measures of the local economic business “climate” in which these individuals are attempting to obtain employment. The VR service costs are broken out by specific type of service and, as Gramlich (in Pelavin, 1989) suggested above, also are reported for specific disability groups. An extensive earnings profile, based on quarterly earnings, is obtained for all applicants. This profile spans at least three years of pre-VR earnings as well as seven years of post-VR earnings. The

pre-VR earnings are then used to incorporate two statistical tests for the “quality” of the VR program dropouts as a viable comparison group to their counterparts who received the VR treatment regimen. An econometric model based on a “fixed effects” approach is then used to examine the impacts of the VR services on the seven years of post-VR earnings, while controlling for the influence of the demographic, socio-economic, and local economic environment factors. These earnings impacts for the treatment group are then compared to the service costs to obtain a simple “benefit-cost” ratio for each of the various disability groups.

## Overview of Analyses to Control for Selection Bias in Evaluations of VR

A pivotal issue in VR evaluation (as well as any manpower training initiative) is how to control for the well-known problems caused by “selection bias” (Rupp, Bell, and McManus, 1995) when program participants opt into a training program.<sup>1</sup> Biased measures of earnings impacts arise when factors that affect participation in a program, such as motivation, are correlated with other factors that affect these earnings.

Economists have followed three strategies to eliminate this bias in determining “treatment effects” for the various manpower training programs that have arisen since the Great Society legislation of the early 1960s (Friedlander et al., pp 1815-1823). The “gold standard”, of course, involves an experimental design with random assignment to a no-treatment control group. Quasi-experimental designs involve the selection of a counterfactual chosen from individuals found outside the program being evaluated (“external” comparison groups) or with some exposure to the program (“internal” comparison groups).

Each of these methodologies has been extensively explored as a possible design option in the evaluation of public-sector VR (BPA, 1988). Controlled experimentation in VR must overcome political, administrative, and ethical considerations. Specifically, random assignment of persons with disabilities to a no-treatment control group was deemed infeasible due to regulatory barriers (by Congress and state program officials) and concerns voiced by service-delivery practitioners when there is a lack of excess demand for services and, correspondingly, no waiting lists from which to draw a no-treatment cohort (Hotz, 1992, pp. 86-88). Moreover, the ethical concerns from denying early intervention and the resulting potential harm from a service delay were particularly acute given the 2.5 year length of a typical VR intervention (BPA, pp 22-31).

This leaves quasi-experiments as the basis for determining the impacts of VR service provision on participant earnings. Much of the debate of the last 15 years in the evaluation arena has been concerned with the viability of *external* comparison groups to satisfactorily control for selection bias.<sup>2</sup> Bell et al. (1995, page 21) posit that for a non-experimental estimator to contend with experiments in evaluations of training programs the former method must be of low cost and administratively easy to implement, relatively free of selection bias and perceived by policy-makers as such. Heckman et al. (Econometrica, 1998) argue that such estimators:

<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of the selection bias issue as it pertains to the general manpower training programs see Hotz in Manski and Garfinkel (1992, pp 82-86).

<sup>2</sup>The debate was joined by the independent studies by LaLonde (1986) and Fraker and Maynard (1987) which questioned the validity of using nonexperimental methods to determine the impacts of job-training programs. Shortly thereafter Heckman and Hotz (JASA, 1989) published their rejoinder which resurrected the viability of nonexperimental techniques given that the appropriate estimators which passed various specification tests were implemented. Their findings were buttressed empirically in an evaluation of quasi-experimental vs. experimental estimates of the impacts of the JTPA program (Heckman, et. al, Econometrica, 1998) and in a re-examination by Dehejia and Wahba (JASA, 1999) of the NSW data using an appropriately-matched subset of the original comparison group constructed by LaLonde.

“perform well in replicating the results of the experiment when they are applied to comparison group data satisfying the following criteria: (i) the same data sources (i.e., the same surveys or the same type of administrative data or both) are used for participants and non-participants, so that earnings and other characteristics are measured in an analogous way; (ii) participants and non-participants reside in the same local labor markets; and (iii) the data contain a rich set of variables relevant to modeling the program participation decision. If the comparison group data fails to satisfy these criteria, the performance of the estimators diminishes greatly” (Smith and Todd, 2001).

The conditions (i) and (iii) above make implementing external comparison groups in evaluations of VR efficacy particularly problematic. Specifically, difficulties arise because of issues related to the onset, severity, and duration of the disabling condition for the person receiving services. Few data sources have information pertaining to an impairment comparable to that collected for persons receiving public-sector VR.<sup>3</sup> The BPA study (1988, pages 39-44) examined numerous external comparison groups persons with disabilities and determined that there were too many non-comparability issues to make them feasible. Perhaps most disconcerting is the lack of data on the “maturation” of the disability. As BPA notes (1988, Appendix page C-6), “there may be a natural maturation process in the progress and resolution of medical problems such that for some VR clients, they only come into VR when finally ready to consider entry or re-entry into the labor market.” It is evident that the deterioration, stability, or improvement in a person’s functional capabilities play a crucial role in the “participation decision” to apply for VR services. An externally-drawn comparison group of eligible non-applicants not having such data is suspect.

Given these weaknesses in gauging VR impacts with non-experimental “external” comparison groups, another tack is to follow the approach of Bell et al. (1995). They have re-visited and provided further support for the use of non-participating program applicants as a valid “internal” comparison group for evaluating program efficacy. They argue that “three groups of later attriters from the intake process - withdrawals, screen-outs, and no-shows - may correspond much more closely to participants, on both observed and unobserved characteristics, than the more commonly used comparison group of eligible non-applicants.” In addition to being better matched on such factors as labor market status and motivation, these groups are more likely to demonstrate similar time paths of earnings just prior to application as well as permanent vs. transitory aspects of pre-program dip (Bell, et. al., 1995).

## **Program Applicants as a Comparison Group within VR**

So which of these different groups of program applicants is most appropriate for gauging the efficacy of VR service provision? The standardized administrative data base maintained through federal mandate by all state VR agencies (the RSA-911) contains a “closure” code for all the possible outcomes for an applicant for service provision. These codes loosely correspond to the degree of exposure to the VR system experienced by the various non-participating program applicants detailed by Bell et al. [1995] (i.e., withdrawals, screen-outs, and no-shows; see Exhibit 2.1, page 24).

In VR nomenclature, persons who apply but are not formally accepted for an individualized service plan are categorized as “Status 08” closures. In FY 1988, some 42.1 % of applicants to the Virginia DRS (4,968 of 11,811

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<sup>3</sup>One exception is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which collects detailed information about a person’s functional capabilities. Issues of non-comparability still exist in matching on the VR system’s condition classification and the “maturation” of the disability.

people) had this closure status. A subsequent “reason not accepted” code serves to designate whether a person is a withdrawal or a screen-out. Roughly three-fourths of the people closed in this status are withdrawals (3,739 people). Withdrawals from VR are likely to be more similar with respect to demographic, socioeconomic, and disability severity and maturation variables than an external comparison group which has not applied for services. On the other hand, withdrawals can differ from VR participants in terms of motivation or perceived benefits from a treatment regimen and may differ with respect to the eligibility criteria used for intake. Additionally, there is some degree of uncertainty about the nature of an individual’s impairment if they are administratively “closed - not accepted”. While applicants formally accepted for VR services must have a medically-certified disabling condition the information about “condition classification” for those persons not accepted may be self-reported or based on out-dated material from a medical file.

Screen-outs comprise the remaining quarter of the Status 08 closures in FY 1988. As Bell et al. (1995, page 27) note, some of the screen-outs may have opted to withdraw even if they had initially been accepted for VR service provision. These individuals certainly differ from VR participants in terms of the eligibility criteria. VR eligibility criteria require that the applicant has a medically certified disabling condition and that VR service will then result in reasonable prospects of achieving a vocational outcome. Moreover, VR screen-outs can be further sorted into two distinct groups according to the nature/maturation of their disabling condition: 1) those too severely disabled to benefit from VR services (556 people, or 45% of all screen-outs); and 2) those not severely enough disabled to be eligible for VR (673 people, or 55%).

The BPA (1989, page A-51) evaluation design proposed using these two groups as part of a “triangulation” approach to gauging VR impacts on participants. In this framework, the earnings paths for those persons judged “too severely disabled” are used as a lower-bound estimate of VR impacts. Conversely, the earnings stream for the not-severely-enough-disabled cohort would then serve as an upper-bound. VR impacts would then be “bracketed” by these two groups of screen-outs. However, as Bell et al. (1995, page 31) note “the tightness of these bounds is not considered.” They note the lack of an experimental control to serve as a benchmark for testing the viability of these screen-outs as a comparison group. The VR Design Evaluation conferees ultimately rejected the triangulation approach because the direction of the bias was ultimately judged to be unclear. (See “Design Critiques for Evaluating Vocational Rehabilitation: Final Report,” Summary Statement Chapter 6, Pelavin Associates, Inc., September 29, 1989, pages 1-5.) In the same report, Rossi (Pelavin, page 3) argues for placing all such “border-line ineligible” into an experimental pool to be randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.

This leaves VR program no-shows/dropouts, classified as “Status 30” closures as a possible internal comparison group. As Dean and Dolan (1991, pages 571-574) discuss at length elsewhere, dropouts are the most appropriate comparison group with respect to the paramount consideration of minimizing pre-enrollment differences. Acceptance into VR would seem to infer that participants and subsequent dropouts are well-matched on the crucial issue of disability maturation. Having the motivation to apply along with the observed and unobserved characteristics to pass the eligibility screens obviates the need to model the application and acceptance decision (Cooley et al., 1979). Once accepted for services, Status 30 closures then dropout prior to receipt of significant service provision – with the only purchased service being a diagnostic evaluation. This is unlikely to augment the person’s human capital and subsequent employment prospects to a significant degree (BPA, 1988).

Of course, the issue of the person dropping out suggests unobserved differences from VR participants that can introduce bias. Moreover, the direction of the bias is most likely unknown. This is because the RSA-911 administrative data base uses the same responses for the reason why the person dropped out of VR as it provides for the reason why

a person is not accepted, with three exceptions. VR counselors are not permitted to use the “no disabling condition”, “no vocational handicap”, or “not meet priority” screen-out reasons. As Dean and Dolan (1991) and Bell et al. (1995) note, on the one hand, program drop-outs may be more motivated/less severely impaired and are able to secure employment on their own - which leads to their dropping out of VR. An earlier study of VR impacts by Abt Associates (1974) found that the Status 30 cohort had characteristics that made them better candidates for competitive employment than the “successfully rehabilitated” (Status 26) cohort. However, the BPA (1988) study of more recent VR data did not support this finding and found no evidence that the dropouts are more likely to succeed than the “closed-successfully rehabilitated” cohort. On the other hand, they may be less motivated, or have a deteriorating health condition that precludes them from completing a prescribed service regimen.

The seriousness of the problem resulting from this deteriorating “health effect” could be examined by investigating any impairment-related reasons that might cause the Status 30 cohort to dropout. A possible remedy then, implied from a suggestion by an anonymous referee, would be to exclude these people from the comparison group. However, in the approach taken by the authors, the *treatment* group includes both cohorts deemed “successfully rehabilitated” (3,637 persons closed “Status 26” who attained their employment objective for at least 60 days) and “not rehabilitated” (2,291 persons closed “Status 28” who did not achieve their vocational objective after the receipt of significant service provision).<sup>4</sup> Listed explanations for the latter cohort’s lack of employability are the same as those provided for the dropout cohort. “Handicap too severe” is the reason provided by almost one-fifth (18.6%) of the not rehabilitated persons, even a greater proportion than provided for the dropout cohort. Excluding individuals with such reasons for dropping out from the comparison group, while comparable individuals remain in the treatment group would clearly lead to biased treatment impacts. On balance, then, the entire (Status 30) dropout cohort would seem to be the best comparison group available. Statistical tests of the “quality” of this comparison group are presented in a later section.

## Using Applicants Rather than Closures for Evaluative Purposes

Historically, the typical economist’s evaluation of public-sector VR efficacy (see Conley [1969], Bellante [1972], Worrall [1978], and Dean, Dolan and Schmidt [1999]) has used data provided on an annual basis by the state VR agencies. Information on a person’s demographic, socio-economic, disabling condition, and VR service provision is collected in a standardized format by the federal Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA). This reporting system, called the RSA-911, is maintained on a nationwide basis for all cases “closed” from the state VR agency during a given fiscal year.

There are however, some problematic issues encountered in using a data file based on an administrative case closure date to demonstrate VR program efficacy. One problem is that an individual may be closed several times in a given fiscal year, resulting in multiple cases. For example, there were a total of 230 instances where an individual was “closed” more than once by the Virginia VR agency during the FY 1988 reporting period. This figure amounts to two

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<sup>4</sup>The inability of the latter group to secure employment (an outcome) does not lessen the fact that they still received treatment. Indeed, the average service provision is higher for the not rehabilitated (Status 28) versus rehabilitated (Status 26) cohorts - cite figures.

percent of all the applicants whose cases were closed by 1997. “Double-counting” issues arise since cases are not linked to an individual identifier on the R-911. This results in difficulties in measuring both how such persons with multiple VR episodes benefit in terms of a vocational outcome as well as the total value of VR services received.

A more serious problem emerges due to the varying outcomes and subsequent duration of a VR case. Many VR cases involve “quick closures” where a person may: 1) be ineligible for services; 2) leave after a short while upon making the determination that VR services are not appropriate; or 3) be “placed” in a vocational outcome after a brief VR intervention. Such cases are often closed from the VR rolls in the same year the person applies for services. At the other end of the spectrum are cases lasting several years. In such instances an individual may have embarked on a job-training or education regimen. Alternatively, the person may be unable to secure employment after completing the prescribed VR service package. The “case” languishes until the VR agency terminates the person from its rolls as “not successfully rehabilitated”.

The upshot is that a cohort of closed cases in a given fiscal year includes people who apply for VR over a span of several different years. This introduces a host of mostly unobserved variables potentially impacting outcomes which cause problems in the resulting evaluation. First, there may be changes in the eligibility requirements (e.g., establishing an “order of selection”) from year to year that are unobserved to the researcher. Secondly, there may be different budgetary considerations not transparent to the researcher that affect the VR service package offered from applicants in one fiscal year versus another. Finally, people may be enrolling in the program in widely divergent economic conditions. People “successfully rehabilitated” who apply and are subsequently closed in the same year may be benefitting from a robust economy — not the VR service package. The unobservable motivation of such persons may differ dramatically from those persons who applied for VR several years prior, perhaps during a downturn in the economy, to improve their skills through a longer-term job-training program.

These problems, however, can be avoided by examining cohorts according to the year of enrollment into VR and then tracking their subsequent progression through the VR process. As the BPA study (1988, pages C-12, and 52) notes “In order to control for external events that take place during the treatment it is important that the treatment and control groups experience the same history.” It is critical that there be a “comparison over the same calendar time period (thus keeping constant the local economic conditions, community service environments, and Federal policy conditions) of employment and nonemployment situations between matched clients served and not served by VR.” This procedure allows for examining a more homogeneous group in that they are applying under the same conditions with respect to eligibility, budgetary, and “business cycle” considerations. Thus, an evaluation based on applicants in a given fiscal year allows for more of an “apples to apples” comparison of persons who receive VR services with those who apply but ultimately do not get services.

Another advantage to this approach is that it acknowledges that vocational rehabilitation takes time and enables a more explicit accounting of the longitudinal nature of VR service provision. While ostensibly a “time-limited” service regimen, many VR plans may be several years in duration. Tracking a cohort according to year of application allows for a more logical enumeration of the flow of both vocational outcomes and VR service dollars. In essence, one can think of an applicant “class of ...” for a given fiscal year, with different years of “graduation”, and varying service regimens and vocational outcomes.

An illustration of this approach is presented in **Table 1** on the following page for the 11,596 applicants to the Virginia Department of Rehabilitative Services (DRS) in state fiscal year 1988 (July 1, 1987 through June 30, 1988). In

TABLE 1

**Initial Administrative Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for  
DRS Applicants in FY 1988**

**Closure Status of DRS Applicant**

Closed in Fiscal Year	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		Total for Year	
	% of Total	VR Cost per Person	% of Total	VR Cost per Person	% of Total	VR Cost per Person	% of Total	VR Cost per Person	% of Total	% of all VR Expenditures
1988	46.8	\$35	24.7	\$66	8.6	\$453	16.6	\$959	28.4	7.6%
1989	44.5	\$47	45.9	\$63	31.4	\$572	45.6	\$1,242	42.4	25.8%
1990	6.6	\$90	19.6	\$130	24.2	\$831	19.6	\$1,930	15.0	18.7%
1991	1.7	\$130	6.9	\$69	17.7	\$1,370	8.2	\$2,359	7.2	12.6%
1992	0.4	\$30	1.5	\$259	8.0	\$1,745	3.6	\$3,165	2.9	7.3%
1993	0.0	\$0	0.6	\$101	4.1	\$2,287	2.4	\$3,943	1.6	5.5%
1994-2001			0.9	\$1,474	5.9	\$5,005	3.9	\$10,333	2.4	21.4%
Active									0.1	1.2%
Totals Per Person	4,879	\$223,426 \$46	884	\$82,505 \$93	2,227	\$2,657,786 \$1,193	3,598	\$6,876,622 \$1,911	11,596	\$9,958,945 \$858

this rendering the percentage of the column total and average cost of VR purchased services per person are presented according to the year of closure. Note that this information is provided for the differing VR closure statuses as well as for the total sample. The entry in the last column represents the share of the cumulative purchased VR services expended on clients closed in the given fiscal year.

Several interesting patterns emerge from this longitudinal approach to examining the VR process. Note the relatively large share of all VR applicants who are closed early on due to being ineligible or having determined that VR is inappropriate (i.e., early dropouts). Indeed, more than 90% of all persons who are ineligible for VR services (or do not accept) are terminated from VR within two years. Similarly, more than 90% of the program drop-outs are terminated within three years of application. At the same time, these persons received very little in the way of purchased services, averaging \$46 and \$93 for ineligibles and dropouts (from the total number in each group at the bottom of the respective columns), respectively.

In contrast, relatively few persons are closed in a rehabilitated (16.6%) or not-rehabilitated status (8.6%) in the same year as they applied (1988). Rather, a greater share is terminated in subsequent years, peaking in 1989. Note, that 60% of the not rehabilitated cohort and 38% of the rehabilitated cohort is closed more than two years after the year of application. Concomitantly, the average cost of purchased VR services increases the longer a person enrolled in a VR program, regardless of whether the person was closed rehabilitated or not rehabilitated. In each of these closure cohorts there is a more than ten-fold increase in average service receipt from the first to last year of closure. The 8.6% of the not-rehabilitated cohort which closed in the year of application received only \$453 in purchased services. The value of purchased services averages over \$5,000 for the 5.9% of this cohort closing in the years 1994-2001. A similar story emerges for the rehabilitated cohort, albeit at twice the service cost. One-sixth of this cohort is closed in the year of application and receive \$959 in VR services. While only four percent of successful rehabilitations occur in the interval from 1994-2001 the value of VR service provision exceeds \$10,000. Not surprisingly, the overall cost of service provision, irrespective of closure year, is highest for the 3,598 individuals in the group closed rehabilitated — an average of \$1,911. In contrast, the not rehabilitated cohort received \$1,193 in services purchased by the DRS.

The overall yearly distribution of closures and VR service provision can be gleaned from the “Total for Year” entries in the last two columns. The overall share of the 11,596 VR closures is largest in the year after application (42.4% in 1989) and steadily declines in subsequent periods. Note that some 2.4% of closures occurred more than five years after the year of application (1994-2001) and there are even a few cases still active at this time.

The value of VR purchased services through December, 2000 for the entire “class of 1988” totals almost \$10 million. (This includes the expenditure for those cases still open at this time.) The largest percentage of total VR expenditure, more than one-quarter, occurs in 1989. The bulk of purchased services are given to persons who close from VR in much later periods. Observe that while more than 70% of closures occur in the first two years, they only account for one-third of the share of total cost incurred. Conversely, the expenditure in the periods 1990 and beyond accounts for almost two-thirds of the value of all VR services purchased for this 1988 applicant cohort. Indeed, the 2.4% of total closures occurring in 1994-2001 accounted for over one-fifth (21.4%) of the overall VR expenditure. Overall, the average expenditure for the entire cohort for this initial VR service regimen averages \$858.

A different glimpse of this total expenditure can be provided by examining the share received by each closure cohort. The totals figure at the bottom of each column report the number of persons in each cohort and the total value of these purchased VR services. From this perspective it is apparent that each cohort’s exposure to VR is significantly

different. The 4,879 people in the cohort who applied and were not accepted (or who chose not to receive VR) comprise 42% of all applicants and yet receive less than two percent of service provision (invariably a general medical examination). The dropout cohort of 884, who makeup eight percent of the applicants, receive only one percent of VR services. Thus, half of the applicants receive only three percent of the purchased services. The bulk of services — 69% of the total are given to the rehabilitated cohort, who comprise less than one-third of the applicant population. Finally, the not rehabilitated cohort receive more than one-quarter of the purchased services and yet represent less than 20% of all applicants.

## Additional Service Provision Beyond Initial Closure from VR

While VR has always been a provider of “time-limited” services, the notion of “workplace supports” connotes service provision of a more ongoing nature. Indeed, when evaluating VR service impacts it seems somewhat short-sighted to focus on only a single episode of an intervention when more services may be required by the individual at some point in the not-too-distant future. Fortunately, the longitudinal data base maintained by the Virginia VR agency allows for tracking of services not only on a “case-basis”, but for the individual consumer as well. Specifically, a file is maintained of all purchased services provided to consumers of VR from 1988 through the present. As a result, service provision can be tracked for all VR episodes occurring during this interval.

Recall that the almost-\$10 million in service expenditure reported in **Table 1** is for the *initial* administrative case closure year for the cohort of 11,596 applicants during FY1988. As **Table 2** on the following page reveals, it turns out that almost one-quarter (2,885 persons) of this cohort has some subsequent contact with the Virginia VR agency. This contact could range from merely applying for more services all the way up to being accepted for significant service provision and being deemed successfully rehabilitated. Almost 40% of the population with more than one VR episode, or 1,145 cases, had not been initially accepted for VR. These people can be viewed as re-applicants. At the other extreme are the 1,029 people, or 36% of the multiple-episode cohort, who were initially rehabilitated and who then came back for more. These people can be considered “recidivists”. In between are the early drop-outs (223 individuals, or 7.7% of all persons with multiple VR episodes) and those persons not employed after receiving significant services (488, or 16.9%). The latter two cohorts can be viewed as trying to complete a (perhaps altered) VR employment plan, given that the first attempt did not “pan” out.

So how big an issue is subsequent VR episodes? To put its magnitude in context consider that the VR service expenditure for this cohort was initially some \$2.7 million for their first intervention. The cost for this cohort’s second VR episode, as reported in the bottom right corner of **Table 2**, is almost 50% greater, at \$3.9 million. Moreover, there are an additional 1,273 cases of a third (or even more) VR episode from 1988 through 2000 that cost another \$2.2 million. All told, **Table 2a** on the following page reveals that one-quarter of the initial applicant cohort in 1988 has 4,158 cases of subsequent VR contact, receiving another \$6.1 million in VR service provision. This extra spending results in more than \$16 million in total VR service expenditure for the “Class of 1988”, or 60% more than what was reported for their initial episode.

To some extent, the outcome of subsequent VR service episodes depends on the initial outcome. Consequently, the subsequent closure status, number of cases, average VR service expenditure, and year of closure is reported for each of the *initial* closure statuses of the 1988 applicant cohort.

**TABLE 2 Subsequent Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for FIRST "Recidivism" Case (Subsequent Closure Statuses are NOT linked to Initial Closure Status)**

**Closure Status of DRS Applicant**

	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		Total for Year	
	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	% of all VR Expenditures
Initial (FY 88) Closure	1,145	\$61	223	\$118	488	\$1,074	1,029	\$2,055	2,885	27.5% (\$2,734,910)

**Subsequent Closures**

1988	6	\$27	2	\$0	---	-----	3	\$13	11	0.0
1989	93	\$56	9	\$6	17	\$762	53	\$1,415	172	2.4
1990	160	\$70	28	\$42	74	\$763	128	\$1,655	390	7.2
1991	167	\$80	24	\$123	97	\$1,232	126	\$2,155	414	10.4
1992	144	\$57	20	\$48	89	\$1,841	97	\$2,014	350	9.4
1993	135	\$87	27	\$268	78	\$1,235	106	\$2,084	346	8.6
1994-2001	131	\$235	188	\$155	326	\$2,050	427	\$3,439	1,072	56.2
Active									130	5.7
Totals Per Person	836	\$80,633 \$96	298	\$41,616 \$140	681	\$1,117,425 \$1,641	940	\$2,443,105 \$2,599	2,885	\$3,906,530 \$1,354

**TABLE 2a Subsequent Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for ALL "Recidivism" Case (Subsequent Closure Statuses are NOT linked to Initial Closure Status)**

**Closure Status of DRS Applicant**

	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		Total for Year	
	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	% of all VR Expenditures
Initial (FY 88) Closure	1,145	\$61	223	\$118	488	\$1,074	1,029	\$2,055	2,885	27.5% (\$2,734,910)

**Subsequent Closures**

1988	12	\$27	4	\$0			6	\$13	22	0.0%
1989	117	\$58	12	\$5	25	\$778	76	\$1,491	230	2.3%
1990	171	\$67	31	\$38	85	\$739	143	\$1,712	430	5.3%
1991	187	\$79	27	\$110	109	\$1,253	146	\$2,141	469	7.7%
1992	171	\$56	23	\$63	95	\$1,988	108	\$2,368	397	7.5%
1993	185	\$76	29	\$251	91	\$1,385	130	\$2,116	435	6.9%
1994-2001	241	\$198	323	\$139	535	\$1,937	784	\$3,337	1,883	61.4%
Active									292	9.0%
Totals Per Person	1,084	\$104,744 \$97	449	\$57,899 \$129	940	\$1,569,932 \$1,670	1,393	\$3,818,168 \$2,740	4,158	\$6,101,854 \$1,467

## Subsequent Outcomes and Costs for Persons Initially Not Accepted

Consider first, in **Table 2b** on the following page, the cohort of 1,145 individuals who did not make it beyond the applicant status (i.e., not accepted) when they applied for VR services in FY 1988. This cohort received a total of only \$70 thousand in VR services during this initial episode, or an average of \$61 per person. These costs were solely for purchasing a medical diagnosis and/or evaluation to determine eligibility for services, or perhaps for transportation to such an appointment. The bottom right-hand corner of **Table 2b** reveals that these people had 1,674 subsequent episodes of VR through 2000 at an average VR cost of \$1,222, resulting in an additional VR expenditure of more than \$2 million.

Of course this average expenditure masks widely divergent service receipt, depending on the outcome of subsequent VR episodes. Should a person not be accepted again upon further application, as occurred in 587 cases, the additional costs to VR are quite small (\$82 on average, for a total of \$47,962). Note that the year in which the subsequent closure(s) took place are reported individually for the year of application (1988) and the five following years, as well as for the interval 1994 through 2001. There are 86 cases reported in the last row that are still active as of January, 2001 and thus do not have a closure date or status. The total cost of these cases is substantial – \$193,698 – which comprises almost 10% of the total cost of subsequent VR services for this not-accepted cohort. The average cost for these cases is \$2,252, which is almost twice the overall average of \$1,222. The number of cases and average cost are fairly stable for the five years after application. The numbers drop significantly in the later years interval (only 99 persons not accepted in 1994-2001) but the average service cost more than doubles to \$156.

Roughly 2/3 of the cases (1087/1674, or 64.9%) who applied but weren't initially entering a VR service regimen are accepted for VR services on their second "go-round". This group can be perceived as a potential comparison group since they form a "staggered cohort". A small portion, 187 cases (or 11.2% of the total), choose to drop out prior to what VR terms "significant service provision". The costs to VR of such cases are trivial – less than \$25 thousand. The number of closures per year for these drop-outs seems to be fairly stable, at between 10-20 cases annually for the interval 1990-2001. One interesting point is the fairly high cost per case, at \$883, for the cohort closing in the 1994-2001.

More than twice as many cases, 379 — or 22.6% of the initial withdrawal/screen-outs, are not rehabilitated after a subsequent (second or more) VR episode. The cost to VR are substantial, more than \$627 thousand, and average \$1,655 per case. The distribution of number of closures per year is fairly uniform, ranging from 32-51 closures per year from 1989 through 1994 and about 25 cases annualized for the period 1994-2001. In general, the costs per closure increase the later the year of closure, emphasizing the importance of tracking on-going VR assistance.

A similar number of cases, 435 — more than one-fourth of all subsequent VR episodes, end up being successfully rehabilitated after initially withdrawing or being screened out. These cases cost some \$1.15 million, for an average of \$2,649 in additional VR services. There are more closures in the period 1989-1991 (between 44 and 61 per year) than in subsequent years, when only about 30 cases per year close. However, the notion of time-limited VR services is further disabused as the cost per case is more than twice as much for the latter closures. Further evidence of the necessity of viewing VR service provision on an ongoing basis is provided in the last column, which reports the share of total amount expended according to year of closure. Subsequent closures occurring in the interval 1994-2001, along with the significant number of cases that are still active, accounted for almost two-thirds of the more than \$2 million expended on all persons who chose to re-visit VR after not being initially accepted in FY 1988.

**TABLE 2b Subsequent Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for ALL "Recidivism" Cases Whose Initial Closure Status is: NOT ACCEPTED (1,145 Clients; \$61 VR Cost Per Person)**

**Closure Status of DRS Applicant**

Subsequent Closure Year	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		Total for Year	
	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	% of all VR Expenditures
1988	12	\$27	4	\$0	6	\$13	22		22	0.0%
1989	99	\$58	9	\$6	44	\$883	166	\$1,516	166	4.1%
1990	111	\$71	16	\$46	51	\$638	231	\$1,561	231	6.1%
1991	102	\$72	19	\$69	44	\$1,419	226	\$1,986	226	9.4%
1992	81	\$67	11	\$109	48	\$2,684	171	\$3,239	171	11.5%
1993	83	\$71	18	\$209	32	\$1,397	164	\$1,850	164	5.5%
1994-2001	99	\$156	110	\$883	190	\$1,823	608	\$3,465	608	53.9%
Active							86		86	9.5%
Totals Per Person	587	\$47,962 \$82	187	\$24,122 \$129	379	\$627,233 \$1,655	435	\$1,152,469 \$2,649	1,674	\$2,045,484 \$1,222

## Subsequent Outcomes and Costs for Persons Who Initially Drop-Out

A second group to seek subsequent VR services is the cohort who was initially accepted for VR and then, for whatever reason, dropped out of the program. There is minimal further exposure to VR for the 223 persons who applied in 1998 and then quickly dropped out (after only receiving \$118 in VR services). **Table 2c** on the following page reveals that these cases represent less than eight percent of the total number of subsequent VR episodes at a total cost of only \$413,806. About 40% of these cases were not accepted or dropped out again and cost VR less than \$100 per case. Another quarter received a significant amount of services, \$1,259, and yet was not rehabilitated. Interestingly enough, the most prevalent closure category for the initial drop-outs is successful rehabilitation, comprising almost 30% of all subsequent outcomes. There are about ten such case closures per year during the 1990's. These cases received almost \$3,000 in additional VR service provision.

Once again, the bulk of service provision is for persons closed, or still receiving services, in the interval from 1994-2001. Indeed, almost 70% of subsequent VR expenditure on drop-outs who got another exposure to VR occurred for such closures occurring in the interval more than five years after initially leaving VR.

## Subsequent Outcomes and Costs for Persons Who Initially are Not Rehabilitated

The third group seeking VR services are those persons initially closed “not rehabilitated”, a designation given after a person receives a significant amount of VR services and then is unable to secure employment. The subsequent VR experience of this cohort through the year 2001 is reported in **Table 2d**. There are 488 persons who returned for subsequent VR services after originally being terminated as “not rehabilitated” (and receiving an average of \$1,074 in services). This group comprises about one of every six persons who seek subsequent VR services. They account for 685 subsequent episodes at an additional cost of \$932,460; one-sixth of both the number and total cost of all subsequent VR episodes for the cohort who initially applied for services in FY88. The average cost for subsequent VR episodes is \$1,361 per case, almost \$300 more than what was expended on this group in their initial VR exposure.

The first two closure groups in **Table 2d** on the following, not accepted and early drop-outs, comprise slightly more than one-third of all subsequent VR cases. They incur very little in the way of VR costs – in the vicinity of \$100 per case — and obviously have minimal implications for VR.

Some 28% of those persons initially closed “not rehabilitated” are then also subsequently closed in the same status. The average cost of subsequent episodes of purchased VR services for this group is \$1,376. There is a fairly steady flow of such closures on an annualized basis during the 1990s. Note the 124 cases closed in the interval from 1994-2001 comprise almost two-thirds of all subsequent “not rehabilitated” closures. It is evident this group is on the VR rolls for a long time. Moreover, the VR costs for those persons closed in the latter half of the 1990s are the most expensive, in excess of \$1,500 per case.

Another 28% are closed successfully rehabilitated. In other words, a significant portion of persons initially terminated not rehabilitated came back for more VR and was then closed as rehabilitated. This group received a lot of VR services, at an average cost of \$2,778. The costs are more expensive the later the person is closed rehabilitated. Observe that the 135 persons closed in the interval 1994-2001 received an additional \$3,253 in VR services – about twice as much as those persons closed earlier in the decade. Indeed, as the last column indicates, more than 80% of the subsequent VR costs for the entire group of persons initially closed not rehabilitated are incurred by either persons closed in 1994-2001 or persons still in the VR system (i.e., “Active”).

**TABLE 2c Subsequent Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for ALL "Recidivism" Cases Whose Initial Closure Status is: EARLY DROP-OUT (223 Clients; \$118 VR Cost Per Person)**

Subsequent Closure Year	Closure Status of DRS Applicant										Total for Year	
	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		#	% of all VR Expenditures		
	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person				
1988												
1989	5	\$26	2	\$0	1	\$0	4	\$1,915	12	1.9%		
1990	8	\$27	5	\$74	11	\$814	9	\$2,426	33	7.6%		
1991	20	\$113	3	\$147	10	\$752	7	\$3,662	40	8.7%		
1992	12	\$66	3	\$28	7	\$1,030	6	\$1,567	28	4.2%		
1993	21	\$19	1	\$0	10	\$394	13	\$2,386	45	8.5%		
1994-2001	17	\$9	29	\$100	42	\$1,770	56	\$3,237	144	62.5%		
Active									24	6.6%		
Totals Per Person	83	\$3,942 \$47	43	\$3,783 \$88	81	\$101,970 \$1,259	95	\$276,794 \$2,914	326	\$413,806 \$1,269		

**TABLE 2d Subsequent Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for ALL "Recidivism" Cases Whose Initial Closure Status is: NOT REHABILITATED (488 Clients; \$1,074 VR Cost Per Person)**

**Closure Status of DRS Applicant**

Subsequent Closure Year	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		Total for Year	
	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	% of all VR Expenditures
1988										
1989	9	\$32			6	\$417	10	\$1,459	25	1.9%
1990	15	\$17	3	\$4	9	\$308	7	\$1,240	34	1.3%
1991	21	\$40	3	\$0	22	\$1,516	5	\$1,852	51	4.7%
1992	29	\$36	4	\$17	14	\$850	16	\$1,621	63	4.2%
1993	27	\$23	7	\$408	17	\$1,164	18	\$1,832	69	6.0%
1994-2001	46	\$269	71	\$73	124	\$1,564	135	\$3,253	376	69.8%
Active									67	12.2%
Totals Per Person	147	\$15,430 \$105	88	\$8,108 \$92	192	\$264,240 \$1,376	191	\$530,649 \$2,778	685	\$932,460 \$1,361

## **Subsequent Outcomes and Costs for Persons Who Initially are Rehabilitated**

The last group to examine are the true “recidivists” - persons initially closed successfully rehabilitated and who then subsequently re-apply for more VR services. **Table 2e** on page 21 provides the number and cost of subsequent VR episodes for the 1,029 applicants in FY1988 who are initially closed as rehabilitated (and received more than \$2,000 in VR services in the process). This group had 1,473 subsequent VR encounters, at an average cost of \$1,840 per case.

The cost per case varies dramatically with the outcome of the subsequent VR episode. The first two groups, not accepted and early drop-outs, account for more than one-quarter of all cases of recidivism. However, the total expenditure for this group is less than \$60 thousand, with a per case average of only about \$150.

Some 20% of the initially rehabilitated cases ended up with a subsequent closure status of “not rehabilitated”. These cases are fairly costly, averaging just over \$2,000 per closure. A recurring theme in this analysis is the significant interval of time during which persons are involved in VR. More than 60% of the cases subsequently closed “not rehabilitated” occurred in the latter portion of the decade. Once again, these 179 cases with closure dates in the interval 1994-2001 are also the most expensive — at \$2,355 in purchased VR services.

The last group of interest is the cohort closed rehabilitated (for the second, or more, time). This group accounts for 46% of all cases of subsequent VR, at an average cost of \$2,765. The later the year of closure the more expensive the VR cost, continuing with the pattern noted earlier. Indeed, the average cost of the 384 closures occurring in the interval 1994-2001 (57% of all the successfully rehabilitated closures) is \$3,316, which is more than 50% greater than the highest cost for closures occurring earlier in the decade. This pattern of greater costs in subsequent years is further buttressed in the last column, which reports 72% of the VR expenditure occurring for cases closed in 1994-2001 or still active.

### **Data Elements Required for Developing a Longitudinal Evaluation Framework for VR**

Having established that the appropriate framework for the longitudinal evaluation of VR requires a cohort of VR applicants, the next stage in the analysis is to collect and describe the variables necessary to operationalize such an “outcome-based” assessment. There are four distinct types of data needed, with each “module” being gleaned from a different administrative database. These modules include attributes of the individuals who apply for VR services, measures of the vitality of the local economy in which the person is seeking employment, details concerning the VR service package the person receives, and earnings streams for these individuals both prior to and subsequent to the VR intervention. The elements in each of these modules are discussed in turn.

### **Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 1988 DRS Applicant Cohort**

Being a state-federal training program, state VR agencies are federally mandated to collect a core set of demographic and socio-economic variables for all individuals at the time of application. Economists have long-established that a sub-set of an individual’s “human capital” attributes influence VR outcomes (Conley, 1969; Bellante, 1972; Worrall, 1983). These factors include the person’s disabling condition, gender, race, and age. The availability of other sources of income also will influence a person’s employment decisions.

**TABLE 2e Subsequent Closure Status and Amount of VR Service Provision for ALL "Recidivism" Cases Whose Initial Closure Status is: REHABILITATED (1,029 Clients; \$2,055 VR Cost Per Person)**

**Closure Status of DRS Applicant**

Subsequent Closure Year	Not Accepted		Early Drop-Out		Not Rehabilitated		Rehabilitated		Total for Year	
	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	VR Cost per Person	#	% of all VR Expenditures
1988										
1989	4	\$155	1	\$0	4	\$1,147	18	\$1,354	27	1.1%
1990	37	\$85	7	\$8	14	\$1,325	74	\$1,779	132	5.7%
1991	44	\$99	2	\$603	33	\$1,006	73	\$2,144	152	7.2%
1992	49	\$48	5	\$20	26	\$1,575	55	\$2,182	135	6.0%
1993	54	\$133	3	\$225	32	\$1,801	68	\$2,261	157	8.1%
1994-2001	79	\$250	113	\$176	179	\$2,355	384	\$3,316	755	64.0%
Active									115	8.0%
Totals Per Person	267	\$37,410 \$140	131	\$21,886 \$167	288	\$576,489 \$2,002	672	\$1,858,256 \$2,765	1473	\$2,710,104 \$1,840

**Table 3** below presents a summary of these variables for the 5,198 applicants for DRS services in 1988. The disability profile presented underscores the fact that the VR program serves a population with a diverse range of work-related impairments. Indeed, seven disability classifications will be maintained throughout the paper. The three most common disabilities are musculo-skeletal (27 percent), mental illness (22 percent), and mental retardation (22 percent). The disability variables also include binary designations for the presence of a severe disability (69 percent) and/or secondary disability (35 percent). The VR applicants are 54 percent male and 71 percent Caucasian, fairly representative of the general population. However, this group is relatively young (33 years) and has substantially less education (9.9 years). The VR clientele also reflects a relatively high rate of welfare reciprocity (23 percent), although this is unsurprising given a work disability exists.

**Table 3 -- Selected R-911 Variables for Persons Accepted to DRS in FY 1988**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min.</b>	<b>Max.</b>
Age at Application	32.8	10.2	18.0	58.0
Percent Male	54.0	49.8	0.0	1.0
Percent Caucasian	71.2	45.3	0.0	1.0
Highest Grade Completed (Retarded = 0)	9.9	4.2	0.0	22.0
Primary Disability:				
Percent Hearing/Speech	5.7	23.1	0.0	1.0
Percent Musculo/Skeletal	27.1	44.5	0.0	1.0
Percent Internal	12.2	32.7	0.0	1.0
Percent Mentally Retarded	21.9	41.3	0.0	1.0
Percent Learning Disabled	4.0	19.6	0.0	1.0
Percent Mental Illness	22.1	41.5	0.0	1.0
Percent Substance Abuse	7.0	25.6	0.0	1.0
Percent with Secondary Disability	34.6	47.6	0.0	1.0
Percent Severely Disabled	69.2	46.2	0.0	1.0
Percent Receiving Welfare at Application	22.5	41.8	0.0	1.0

### **Measures of the Local Economic “Environment” Influencing Vocational Outcomes**

Individual characteristics are only one factor affecting vocational outcomes. A region’s current “business climate” may be particularly influential on a person’s earnings, especially given the historically tenuous employment prospects for persons with disabilities. Moreover, it is well understood that business fluctuations can also have an impact on job prospects. Accordingly, both the level as well as any changes in the local economic environment (e.g., unemployment rate, per capita income) should be tracked to account for their influence on any earnings-related outcomes.

In Virginia, city and county-level economic data are aggregated to the “Planning District”-level. Such districts have been formed across regions with similar economic characteristics to solve mutual problems (e.g., transportation,

water resources, solid waste planning) which cross political boundary lines. The planning districts reflect the aggregation of 41 city and 54 county regions into 21 districts. There is tremendous heterogeneity among these planning districts, which include the poorer coal-mining localities in southwestern Virginia as well as the affluent suburbs of Washington, D.C. in the northeastern part of the state.

**Table 4** below shows the range as well as average values for both per capita income and unemployment rates across these 21 districts for the years 1985-1997. Observe from the given values for the ranges that the maximum per capita income is more than twice the value of the minimum for each year spanning the period 1985 through 1987. There is an even wider disparity among the unemployment rates across planning districts. For instance, in 1985 the unemployment rate in a depressed southwestern Virginia planning district level was 16.5 percent; for the Northern Virginia planning district the rate was only 2.8%. Over the entire time span of the analysis the planning districts with the most robust economies experience unemployment rates that are roughly one-fifth of those districts with depressed economies.

**Table 4 -- Economic Environment Variables for Virginia's Planning Districts**

Year	Per Capita Income		Unemployment Rates	
	Range	Average	Range	Average
1985	\$9,817 - \$20,926	\$12,592	2.8 - 16.5	7.8
1986	\$10,278 - \$22,165	\$13,377	2.5 - 15.7	7.0
1987	\$10,659 - \$23,713	\$14,196	2.1 - 12.9	6.1
1988	\$11,360 - \$25,637	\$15,160	1.8 - 9.8	5.3
1989	\$11,955 - \$27,202	\$16,191	1.8 - 8.4	5.2
1990	\$12,742 - \$28,251	\$16,825	2.0 - 11.1	5.9
1991	\$13,247 - \$29,172	\$17,124	3.5 - 13.6	7.8
1992	\$13,906 - \$30,283	\$17,795	4.3 - 14.8	8.2
1993	\$14,187 - \$31,513	\$18,473	3.7 - 13.0	6.5
1994	\$14,695 - \$32,675	\$19,267	3.3 - 15.2	6.2
1995	\$15,174 - \$34,078	\$19,952	3.1 - 13.3	6.0
1996	\$15,790 - \$35,421	\$20,743	2.9 - 12.5	6.1
1997	\$16,417 - \$36,981	\$21,684	2.4 - 11.5	5.5

Comparing the average values over the 13-year interval stresses the importance of the business cycle on employment conditions. The increase in annual per capita income is fairly dramatic, rising from \$12,592 to \$21,684 over the 13-year period. This amounts to a growth rate of more than four percent annually. There is much more of an ebb and flow to the unemployment rate during this period. The unemployment rate consistently declined with the expansion of the mid-to-late 1980s, from 7.8 to 5.9 percent on average. The unemployment rate across all 21 districts then increased to 8.2 percent during the 1991-1992 recession, and has steadily declined thereafter to 5.5 percent in 1997. The "rising tide" of economic growth has clear implications for the prospects of those seeking employment.

## VR Services Received by the 1988 DRS Applicant Cohort

A circumspect description of the socioeconomic attributes for a VR applicant cohort and the local economic conditions in which they seek employment has now been presented. The next step in the analytical framework is to accurately capture the “treatment” variable — the mix of services that VR provides. Clearly, the character of the rehabilitation program will vary systematically with the nature of the disabling condition. However, the RSA-911 reports only the *total* value of services purchased for each person, along with binary designations as to which of a dozen or so general types of services is being provided (e.g., counseling, restorative services, job training). This specification does not provide a meaningful measure of the *intensity* of the service regimen.

Alternatively, the Virginia DRS maintains a purchased-service file which records service-specific invoices for 62 types of rehabilitative services. The specificity of this accounting data requires some subjective aggregation for purposes of this analysis. Following the logical flow of VR, six broader service categories can be defined: 1) diagnosis and evaluation; 2) restoration; 3) education; 4) training; 5) a maintenance stipend; and 6) employment-related support services.

**Table 5** on the following page presents an overview of these categories of service expenditure for those VR applicants who are subsequently accepted for “significant” service receipt (i.e., ineligible and early program dropouts are excluded). This “treatment group” subset of VR applicants is then stratified by the seven disability classifications. Each cell of the table presents three descriptive statistics: 1) the number of cases; 2) the percent of the cohort receiving the service; and 3) the cost per recipient. These three summary statistics reveal that the value and frequency of services can vary widely by service type and disabling condition. Educational services for persons with hearing and/or speech impairments is a prime example. Although only a small fraction receives educational services (6.9%), the cost per recipient is quite high (\$1,737). This cost phenomenon for educational services is consistent across all seven disability categories. In contrast, the frequency of restorative services more closely tracks the disabling condition. Roughly 70 percent of persons with internal and hearing/speech impairments receive restorative services, as compared to only 20-37 percent across the other disability groups. In a similar vein, training services are concentrated on persons with mental retardation — 60 percent of this cohort receives training at a cost per recipient of almost \$2,500.

The bottom portion of the information found on the chart on the previous page presents summary statistics for the entire treatment group. The average cost of VR-purchased services for *all* clients is \$1,269. Roughly two-thirds of this total reflects training (\$531) and restorative (\$364) services. However, the overall average cost for the treatment group masks substantial variation by disability type, which ranges from a low of \$750 for persons with learning disabilities to a high of \$1,773 for persons with mental retardation.

## Earnings for the 1998 DRS Applicant Cohort

To this point, we have asserted that an analysis of VR impacts on vocational outcomes is most accurately depicted using a cohort of applicants in a given period (in our case, Fiscal Year 1988). What vocational outcomes are to be used and how are these obtained? This analysis compares levels of earnings on an annualized basis. These earnings come from a data file, provided by the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC), of quarterly earnings from the period 1985-1997. These quarterly earnings are “aligned” around the dates of VR application and closure and then summed to obtain annual earnings. In other words, annual earnings are not calendar-year earnings. For a person who applies to DRS during the first quarter of FY 1988 (July-September 1987), the first year of pre-program earnings would

**Table 5 -- Distribution of Case Service Expenditure by Primary Disability**

Primary Disability	TOTAL	EXPENDITURE ON						
		D&E	Train	Educ	Restor	Maint	Train	
Hearing/Speech	# Cases	272	272	272	272	272	272	272
	% Rec. Services	91.5%	75.7%	17.2%	6.9%	69.8%	17.6%	21.6%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$1,345	\$110	\$1,286	\$1,737	\$779	\$787	\$557
Musculo/Skeletal	# Cases	1,202	1,202	1,202	1,202	1,202	1,202	1,202
	% Rec. Services	71.9%	54.2%	16.2%	7.6%	36.9%	23.9%	4.7%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$1,628	\$157	\$1,367	\$1,157	\$1,446	\$961	\$239
Internal	# Cases	568	568	568	568	568	568	568
	% Rec. Services	89.4%	67.2%	11.0%	4.7%	71.8%	15.3%	3.3%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$1,719	\$141	\$1,161	\$1,340	\$1,594	\$610	\$323
Mental Retarded	# Cases	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005	1,005
	% Rec. Services	84.3%	51.9%	60.0%	1.4%	22.4%	39.7%	3.1%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$2,102	\$207	\$2,466	\$912	\$216	\$299	\$153
Learning Disabled	# Cases	178	178	178	178	178	178	178
	% Rec. Services	79.7%	63.4%	24.1%	8.9%	28.6%	25.8%	2.8%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$940	\$103	\$1,500	\$1,202	\$410	\$358	\$131
Mental Illness	# Cases	966	966	966	966	966	966	966
	% Rec. Services	76.2%	49.6%	32.0%	9.7%	23.9%	39.9%	5.7%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$1,266	\$213	\$1,280	\$1,335	\$426	\$494	\$339
Substance Abuse	# Cases	306	306	306	306	306	306	306
	% Rec. Services	71.8%	34.3%	21.8%	13.3%	20.2%	48.3%	8.1%
	Avg. per Recipient	\$1,091	\$97	\$594	\$1,379	\$505	\$655	\$207
All Cases	# Cases	4,497	4,497	4,497	4,497	4,497	4,497	4,497
	% Rec. Services	\$1,269	\$91	\$531	\$86	\$364	\$176	

be the sum of the four quarters of earnings prior to July of 1987. A similar quarterly alignment is performed relative to the closure quarter to construct post-program annual earnings.

In sharp contrast, the RSA-911 national data set only reports a single observation for weekly earnings at application for everyone, and earnings in the week of closure only for persons successfully rehabilitated. The longitudinal breadth of the VEC earnings profile has clear empirical advantages over the RSA-reported earnings. A single earnings-at-application report may not reflect the person's true baseline earnings potential. This observation may be especially mis-representative since people often turn to training programs when they are temporarily below their true earnings path (i.e., "pre-program dip"). Nor can one assume that earnings reported in the week of closure will be sustained, especially for persons with disabilities. In short, the longitudinal data provide a more accurate indication of both clients' pre-program earnings potential as well as the duration of any post-program earnings gains.

**Table 6** on the following page presents a profile of three years of *pre-VR* earnings and a *post-VR* earnings history of up to seven years (for those persons closed by 1990). These earnings, which are reported in real 1988

dollars, are provided in the first column for the entire applicant cohort and then for the three sub-sets of treatments, program dropouts, and ineligible, respectively. Annual earnings from the third to second pre-program years initially increase in each group from roughly \$3,000 to \$3,500. Earnings across the board then manifest the pre-program dip phenomenon, with decreases in annual earnings from the second to first pre-VR annualized period ranging from roughly \$200-600; the VR dropouts show the largest decline.

**Table 6 -- Average Annual Earnings, Pre- and Post-VR, for DRS Applicants in 1988, by Closure Status**

	<b>Closure Status</b> (sample size in parentheses)			
	<b>All Closures</b>	<b>Treatment</b> (n = 4,437)	<b>Dropout</b> (n = 696)	<b>Ineligible</b> (n = 3,940)
<b><u>Pre-Program Earnings Period</u></b>				
3rd Year Pre-VR	\$3,063	\$3,094	\$2,963	\$3,046
2nd Year Pre-VR	\$3,492	\$3,525	\$3,443	\$3,464
1st Year Pre-VR	\$3,176	\$3,207	\$2,841	\$3,201
<b><u>Post-Program Earnings Period</u></b>				
1st Year Post-VR	\$3,657	\$4,126	\$3,068	\$3,233
2nd Year Post-VR	\$3,559	\$3,890	\$2,832	\$3,314
3rd Year Post-VR	\$3,343	\$3,662	\$2,772	\$3,085
4th Year Post-VR	\$3,227	\$3,469	\$2,791	\$3,031
5th Year Post-VR	\$3,210	\$3,472	\$2,727	\$3,000
6th Year Post-VR	\$3,254	\$3,526	\$2,706	\$3,051
7th Year Post-VR	\$3,256	\$3,533	\$2,810	\$3,049

Turning to the post-VR period, there is an average increase of almost \$500 for the entire cohort when contrasting the first of seven post-VR annual intervals with the comparable period prior to the VR intervention. It must be emphasized that this first post-VR earnings year is invariably not the next 12-month interval after the first pre-VR year. This is due to the varying-duration VR intervention. Even program ineligible will require a few month period after application. The average duration of VR is about 1.5 years. It is entirely plausible that the first post-VR yearly period for the treatment group may be several years subsequent to the period encompassing the first pre-VR year. Real earnings then dip about \$100 for the second post-VR yearly period \$200 more in the third year, and another \$100 in the fourth year, after which earnings are remarkably stable.

A different picture emerges when examining the post-VR earnings of the various stratified cohorts. First, observe that the “inflation-adjusted” post-VR earnings for the treatment group are higher than the pre-VR earnings in every period. Specifically, these earnings are much higher, almost \$1,000, in the first post-VR year viz-a-viz the first year prior to VR. The average annualized earnings levels then steadily decline by roughly \$200 for each of the next three periods, until they become very stable around \$3,500.

In contrast, the post-VR earnings stream for the dropout cohort reveals lower earnings than in the pre-VR period. The sole exception is the first year after closure from VR, when earnings are \$200 more than in the first year

prior to VR. Real earnings then decline more than \$200 in the subsequent six year intervals, with very little variation around \$2,800.

Finally, the earnings for the program ineligibles differ little from the first pre- and post-VR annual periods. Earnings increase very slightly in the second post-VR annual period. However this is not sustained as annualized earnings decline by more than \$200 in the third post-VR year and diverge very little from this amount in next four years.

## Estimating Earnings Impacts in a Quasi-Experimental Methodology

The best method for gauging VR impacts on earnings is an experimental framework using a randomly-assigned treatment group versus control group of participants who are denied services (Burtless, 1995). However, experimental evaluations of VR are virtually unprecedented due to the ethical and legal obstacles of denying the services of a public program to otherwise eligible persons. A second-best solution uses a “comparison” group in a “quasi-experimental” setting.

A substantial literature has explored the reliability of evaluations using a quasi-experimental framework. This method relies on identifying a valid “comparison” group against which effects on the treatment group can be measured. The major pitfall to this approach is the potential for “selection bias”. Heckman and Hotz (1989) emphasize the importance of appropriate statistical procedures that test the quality of candidate comparison groups using longitudinal earnings. They argue that such tests, when passed, significantly improve the reliability of estimates based on comparison group methodology.

Technically, this evaluation adopts what is called an “internal” comparison group. This term connotes a sub-group that has some exposure to the program but does not receive substantial treatment. By definition, “Status 30” closures or dropouts are persons who apply and are accepted to VR, but never *begin* a prescribed service regimen. The appeal of this group is that the potential problems of selection bias are diminished since members of this group have passed through the same self-selection and programmatic screens as the treatment group. This brand of internal comparison group, also referred to as “no shows”, received recent empirical support in an evaluation by Bell et al. (1995). The longitudinal employment data available using VEC quarterly earnings provide an ideal venue for testing the use of an internal comparison group in the context of the VR program. The discussion below describes a sequence of three sets of statistical tests performed on pre-program longitudinal earnings. These tests are designed to identify increasingly serious forms of selection bias (Bassi; 1983, 1984).

The first set of tests is straightforward, positing that the treatment and comparison groups do *not* differ at the means for observable characteristics which influence earnings (e.g., age, education, disability, race, and gender). However, for the VR cohorts under study, statistically significant differences do exist with respect to these variables. Therefore, measuring treatment impacts must go beyond a simple difference-in-means analysis based on post-program earnings of treatment and comparison groups. At a minimum, regressions including these characteristics and a treatment binary must be run on post-treatment earnings levels.

A second set of tests applies “Hausman” and “Chow” tests performed on the *level* of pre-program earnings. These tests are necessary to detect a more subtle source of selection bias. Plausibly, the treatment and comparison groups might differ in attributes which are not so easily measured yet which influence earnings. Such “unobservable”

characteristics would include, for example, motivation and work discipline. The existence of unobservable differences between the groups could distort any or all of the regression coefficients, including that of the treatment impact. If such differences exist, however, they would also exist before the onset of disability and subsequent treatment. A test for unobservable differences, therefore, entails running an earnings regression for a period preceding the date of application for VR services.<sup>1</sup> A Chow test on that earnings regression asks whether the impact of any demographic characteristic, including membership in the treatment group, differs between the treatment and comparison group. In contrast, a Hausman test focuses entirely on the treatment binary. Both the Chow and Hausman tests indicate the presence of unobservable differences within the specific disability groups and both genders. As a result, regressions on post-program earnings would provide biased estimates of the treatment impact.

However, if the influence of the unobservable differences remains constant over time, then a simple extension of regression analysis — fixed effects modeling (FEM) — can provide unbiased estimates of the treatment impact. FEM acknowledges that there are certain observable and unobservable characteristics which differ between individuals but remain relatively constant over time. As such, those influences are embedded in both pre-disability and post-treatment earning levels. By differencing earnings between any two years, the influences of time-invariant characteristics are eliminated. Although more detail is provided on FEM in the next section, the influence of VR treatment would be estimated by differencing earnings in a post-treatment year and a pre-disability year. To test whether FEM provides unbiased estimates (alternatively, whether the influence of unobservable differences remains constant over time), earnings are differenced between the third and second years prior to application. Another set of Chow and Hausman tests are then performed on the resulting *change-in-earnings* regressions. Separate regressions are run for 14 stratifications of the current cohort — seven disability classifications for both genders. The relevant test results are reported in **Table 7** on the following page. The Hausman test is insignificant for each of these stratifications at the five-percent significance level. The Chow test, however, identifies a change in the influence of unobservable characteristics at the one-percent level for three strata: hearing/speech for men and learning disabilities for both men and women. Consequently, FEM estimates of treatment effects would be suspect for these three strata and are not presented below. For the remaining eleven cohorts, FEM estimates appear to adequately correct for selection bias.

## “Fixed Effects” Estimates of VR Earnings Impacts

Equipped with these 11 valid comparison groups, VR earnings impacts are estimated using the FEM framework on the difference between pre- and post-program earnings. The earnings model is an application which follows Bassi (1983, 1984). Specifically, the FEM model now represents the result of differencing earnings between a given post-VR year and the second year prior to referral (the designated base year prior to the onset of pre-program dip). Conspicuously absent from the resulting earnings difference equation will be two common “human capital” variables (race and education) and all other terms that do not vary with time. Their absence is suggestive of the intuition behind the term “fixed effects” model. Despite the general importance of these attributes on earnings levels, recognize that they are “fixed” (i.e., the attributes *do not change* between any two time periods) and that their influence on post-VR earnings is already accounted for in pre-VR earnings.

**Table 7 -- Chow & Hausman Tests for Treatment vs. Comparison Group Stratified by Gender and DRG**

<b>Tests for the FEM:</b>							
Pre-Ref Earning Change = f (Exper, Exper <sup>2</sup> , Change in Per Capita Income, Change in UE Rate).							
<b>Females: Chow Test p-values:</b>							
	Hrng/Spch	Musc/Skel	Internal	Retarded	Lrng Disa	Mntal III	Subs Ab
3rd - 2nd Pre	0.181	0.378	0.912	0.636	0.002**	0.785	0.625
2nd - 1st Pre	0.399	0.192	0.248	0.186	0.151	0.850	0.742
<b>Males: Chow Test p-values</b>							
	Hrng/Spch	Musc/Skel	Internal	Retarded	Lrng Disa	Mntal III	Subs Ab
3rd - 2nd Pre	0.015*	0.377	0.832	0.456	0.000**	0.093	0.331
2nd - 1st Pre	0.231	0.811	0.354	0.312	0.885	0.054	0.245
* The Wald $\chi^2$ test demonstrates a statistically significant difference at the 5% level.							
** The Wald $\chi^2$ test demonstrates a statistically significant difference at the 1% level.							
<b>Females: Hausman Test Coefficients on Treatment Binary</b>							
	Hrng/Spch	Musc/Skel	Internal	Retarded	Lrng Disa	Mntal III	Subs Ab
3rd - 2nd Pre	-537.32	-374.06	-853.75	-45.05	1105.72	-75.11	136.76
2nd - 1st Pre	-292.70	-734.10	614.73	360.00*	1.37	-113.48	-286.48
<b>Males: Hausman Test Coefficients</b>							
	Hrng/Spch	Musc/Skel	Internal	Retarded	Lrng Disa	Mntal III	Subs Ab
3rd - 2nd Pre	671.89	188.95	780.26	-47.25	-446.95	655.31	-189.55
2nd - 1st Pre	-382.18	-735.58	-479.27	-451.68	-381.54	-295.86	1652.99*
* The t-test demonstrates a statistically significant difference at the 5% level.							
** The t-test demonstrates a statistically significant difference at the 1% level.							

The Virginia data set consists of a panel of seven years of post-VR years of earnings for most individuals. Consequently, there will be seven separate “VR participation” coefficients tracing out a time path of the dollar value of the net impact of VR treatment for each of 11 gender-disability cohorts. The remaining variables in the regression represent some fairly complicated transformations of their original specification due to the first differencing procedure. However, these coefficients continue to measure the cubic influence of potential work experience on earnings. The results of the earnings models are presented for women and men in **Tables 8A and 8B** on the following pages, respectively.

**Table 8a** found on the following page reveals quite divergent impacts for women depending on the nature of the disabling condition and the year being examined. There is no cohort for which statistically significant earnings gains

**Table 8a -- Treatment Impacts Among Women for Seven Post-Program Years Stratified by Disability**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Hrng/Spch</b>	<b>Musc/Skel</b>	<b>Internal</b>	<b>Retarded</b>	<b>Mntal III</b>	<b>Subs Ab</b>
1st Year	753.27 (1.24)	267.18 (0.54)	1528.96** (2.79)	272.04 (1.15)	669.68* (1.70)	1144.09 (1.22)
2nd year	674.23 (1.22)	625.50 (1.34)	1427.56** (2.87)	389.19* (1.83)	394.51 (1.03)	1046.24 (1.22)
3rd year	738.34 (1.35)	616.43 (1.34)	1496.98** (3.02)	297.03 (1.44)	210.39 (0.54)	1010.37 (1.15)
4th year	856.04 (1.49)	600.68 (1.31)	1382.66* (2.81)	400.96* (1.94)	-355.64 (0.93)	1238.72 (1.34)
5th year	837.19 (1.32)	1131.13** (2.36)	1056.89* (2.07)	532.66** (2.52)	-470.22 (1.18)	557.29 (0.58)
6th year	980.30 (1.290)	1308.37** (2.51)	983.51* (1.76)	636.92** (2.84)	-463.28 (1.08)	304.29 (0.29)
7th year	1027.20 (1.19)	1823.32** (3.21)	906.62 (1.45)	825.62** (3.30)	-669.85 (1.45)	217.29 (0.19)
Exper	-124.00 (0.65)	205.83 (1.95)	289.63* (2.42)	-131.04** (2.62)	368.51** (4.16)	87.83 (0.40)
Exper <sup>2</sup>	-7.05 (1.29)	-15.41** (5.21)	-6.12* (2.12)	1.60 (0.87)	-9.11** (3.61)	-1.85 (0.28)
Exper <sup>3</sup>	0.11 (1.15)	0.13** (3.03)	0.04 (0.89)	-0.08* (2.36)	0.06 (1.69)	-0.06 (0.50)
Ycap Chg	-0.03 (0.10)	0.27 (1.61)	0.22 (1.00)	0.12 (1.45)	-0.20 (1.39)	1.33** (3.59)
UE Chg	-200.17 (1.26)	36.41 (0.41)	-53.59 (0.62)	41.65 (0.84)	-126.89 (1.58)	-79.82 (0.34)
Constant	2146.00* (2.06)	176.75 (0.26)	-1539.71* (2.08)	1599.63** (4.46)	-386.77 (0.69)	248.13 (0.17)
R Squared	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03
Std Error	6197.07	7116.56	6939.06	3433.47	6166.29	6833.48
# of Obs	1059	3696	2556	3720	4012	795
p-values from Tests of Joint Significant						
TREAT	0.402	0.101	0.016*	0.023*	0.278	0.860
EXPER	0.105	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.113

**Table 8b -- Treatment Impacts Among Men for Seven Post-Program Years Stratified by Disability**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Musc/Skel</b>	<b>Internal</b>	<b>Retarded</b>	<b>Mntal III</b>	<b>Subs Ab</b>
1st Year	103.27 (0.16)	616.68 (0.69)	940.42** (3.45)	2022.10** (4.61)	504.08 (0.60)
2nd year	-331.50 (0.55)	744.14 (0.90)	964.52** (3.77)	2136.82** (5.02)	-207.93 (0.27)
3rd year	-475.11 (0.80)	1527.28* (1.89)	994.40** (3.59)	2211.64** (5.26)	-1767.39 (2.49)
4th year	-349.12 (0.58)	1429.94* (1.83)	1005.67** (3.75)	2192.29** (5.22)	-1985.21 (2.69)
5th year	372.76 (0.60)	1126.67 (1.36)	1133.12** (4.03)	2248.55** (5.17)	-1382.11 (1.77)
6th year	932.59 (1.39)	1143.63 (1.25)	1220.68** (3.75)	2598.63** (5.40)	-570.96 (0.66)
7th year	1464.49* (1.96)	1018.48 (0.98)	1230.49** (3.38)	2631.89** (4.91)	-56.34 (0.06)
Exper	864.17** (6.22)	387.87* (1.97)	381.69** (5.46)	3.37 (0.04)	-712.95** (3.38)
Exper <sup>2</sup>	-48.28** (11.84)	-24.12** (4.69)	-25.27** (14.74)	-12.85** (4.67)	27.40** (5.70)
Exper <sup>3</sup>	0.50** (7.84)	0.22** (2.87)	0.33** (12.10)	0.12** (2.62)	-0.49** (6.88)
Ycap Chg	0.95** (3.90)	1.04** (2.84)	0.02 (0.25)	0.94** (6.31)	0.65** (2.61)
UE Chg	615.83 (4.98)	-445.51** (2.63)	-132.89* (2.03)	76.11 (0.81)	1067.54 (7.53)
Constant	-1345.47 (1.48)	-2126.39 (1.61)	515.56 (1.09)	-1165.85 (1.81)	3393.04* (2.57)
R Squared	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.06
Std Error	12115.34	8703.79	4202.65	6569.52	7597.82
# of Obs	5824	1779	4147	3852	1689
p-values from Tests of Joint Significant					
TREAT	0.342	0.662	0.000**	0.000**	0.014*
EXPER	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**

are found in every post-VR period. For instance, in the third column, the magnitude of the earnings gains for women with “internal” impairments (e.g, cardiovascular, respiratory impairments) is quite large, ranging from \$900 to more than \$1,500. The interpretation of the “1st Year” coefficient is that the treatment group of Status 26 and Status 28 closures will, on average, have \$1,529 more in earnings than their comparison group of program dropouts (Status 30 closures) in the first year after closure from VR, other variables held constant. This earnings gain is the second largest treatment effect overall for women. However, the treatment effects are only statistically significant in the first six post-VR closure years and are not sustained over time. By the seventh post-VR year the earnings gains have dropped to under \$1,000, and are no longer statistically significantly different from zero. There are two cohorts — women with hearing/speech impairments and substance abusers — for whom there are no statistically significant earnings gains in any post-VR period. Although there are positive impacts for women with mental illness in the first post-VR years, these become negative in the fourth through seventh post-VR yearly periods. The exact opposite pattern is observed for women with either musculo-skeletal impairments or mental retardation. Although the first year earnings gains are relatively small and statistically insignificant, the treatment impacts jump in both magnitude and statistical significance in most successive years. The statistically significant earnings gains are quite large for both cohorts in later post-VR years, rising from \$1,131 to \$1,823 for women with musculo-skeletal impairments, and from \$401 to \$826 for mentally retarded women.

The results found in **Table 8b** on the previous page indicates that the earnings gains among men also vary rather strikingly with disability. For two of the disability cohorts — mental retardation and mental illness — the earnings gains are both statistically significant and remarkably stable over the five-year period. These earnings gains hover around \$1,100 and \$2,300, respectively. For the remaining male disability cohorts the treatment effects of VR services are statistically insignificant, with only rare exceptions.

The influence of the local economic environment is mixed. As expected, the change in per capita income ( $Y_{cap}$  Chg) in a planning district is, with one exception, positively correlated with earnings gains. The coefficient is statistically significant in only six of the eleven stratifications, but the magnitude of the coefficients is interesting. Among men the significant income coefficients are roughly unity — ranging from \$0.78 to \$1.08 — implying that local income changes have a comparable impact in increasing the earnings of male VR participants. The impact of changing locality income is less significant among women, although there is a widely disparate impact in two significant instances — \$0.27 for women with musculo/skeletal impairments versus \$1.34 in cases of the learning disabled. Surprisingly, changes in the local employment conditions (UE Chg) have little, indeed, a confounding effect on the earnings gains of persons receiving VR services. Among women, changing unemployment levels have no significant impact. Moreover, in the case of men with musculo/skeletal and substance abuse, the influence of changing unemployment levels is perversely positive. Only among men with internal impairments, mentally retarded, and learning disabled does one observe a statistically significant coefficient with the anticipated negative sign. Note, however, the magnitude of the effect is substantial — earnings are \$133 and \$639 lower, *ceteris paribus*.

Finally, note the generally significant impacts of the change in work experience (approximated by change-in-age) across gender and disability groups. The signs on the three terms in this cubic specification confirm typical human capital findings concerning a person’s age-earnings profiles. Specifically, earnings increase, but at a decreasing rate, as an individual ages (and acquires more potential work experience).

To lend an efficiency perspective to the estimated earnings impacts, the information found in **Table 9** on following page constructs benefit-cost ratios for each of the 11 gender/disability cohorts. Total benefits for each cohort are obtained by summing the present value of each period’s earnings using a four percent discount rate. These

earnings are the estimated treatment coefficients as reported for women and men in as seen in the information on pages 33 and 34, respectively. Note that two present-value calculations appear in each case. The first includes the values of insignificant treatment coefficients in the present-value calculation. This is arguably correct since these coefficients still represent the best mean estimates of treatment effects. The second calculation is based on a more conservative approach in which the present value of the earnings stream assigns zero earnings in the years for which the treatment impacts are statistically insignificant. The third row in each panel presents the total purchased service costs for each cohort. Taken together, these numbers produce the benefit/cost ratios reported in the last two rows of each panel.

Generally, the information shown in **Table 9** below indicates that VR performs unevenly with respect to disability and gender. If one uses the more liberal calculation of earnings in the benefit-cost ratio (i.e., the “all earnings” figures), men with mental illness have a remarkably large benefit-cost ratio of 15.54. The next highest ratio, at 5.68, is for men with internal impairments. Women with hearing/speech, internal, musculo-skeletal, and substance abuse impairments all have very high benefit-cost ratios of about four. Men with mental retardation also have a very high benefit-cost ratio of 3.5. In contrast, VR services are only marginally effective for women with mental retardation, and men with musculo-skeletal impairments, with benefit-cost ratios roughly slightly in excess of one. Two ratios are negative, but, fortunately are statistically insignificant. Weighting by the number of cases in each cohort, these results indicate an aggregate benefit cost ratio of 2.48 for women and 5.64 for men.

**Table 9 -- Treatment Impacts Among Women for Seven Post-Program Years Stratified by Disability**

	Hearing/ Speech	Musculo Skeletal	Internal	Mental Retarded	Mental Illness	Substance Abuse
<b>PANEL A: WOMEN</b>						
PV all earnings	\$4,978	\$5,246	\$7,639	\$2,797	-\$370	\$4,887
PV significant earnings	\$0	\$3,349	\$6,950	\$2,272	\$644	0
Purchased service cost	\$1,087	\$1,312	\$1,791	\$1,722	\$1,054	\$1,260
Number of cases	147	475	340	473	479	91
B/C Ratio (all earnings)	4.58	4.00	4.27	1.62	-0.35	3.88
B/C ratio (significant earnings)	0.00	2.55	3.88	1.32	0.61	0.00
<b>PANEL B: MEN</b>						
PV all earnings	NA	\$1,228	\$6,464	\$6,371	\$13,663	-\$4,605
PV significant earnings	-	\$1,113	\$2,580	\$6,371	\$13,663	\$0
Purchased service cost	-	\$1,079	\$1,138	\$1,820	\$879	\$1,448
Number of cases	-	708	219	531	481	206
B/C Ratio (all earnings)	-	1.14	5.68	3.50	15.54	-3.18
B/C ratio (significant earnings)	-	1.03	2.27	3.50	15.54	0.00

As expected, using the conservatively estimated earnings stream with only statistically significant earnings results in lower benefit-cost ratios. In five of the 11 cohorts – men and women with internal impairments, women with musculo-skeletal impairments, and men with mental retardation or mental illness — the benefit-cost ratio still exceeds two. The impacts are still marginal, slightly exceeding unity, for women with mental retardation and men with musculo-skeletal impairments. In three instances, for men and women substance abusers and women with hearing/speech impairments, the benefit-cost ratios are now zero. This implies, of course, that there are no statistically significant earnings gains (or losses) to be included in the benefits computation. Using the more conservative earnings estimations lowers the aggregate benefit-cost ratio very slightly for men, down to 5.57, and more dramatically for women, to 1.72.

Given the preliminary nature of this report, there are three caveats to the template which must be recognized when interpreting the benefit-cost ratios. The first consideration is methodological in nature and concerns the estimation procedure for determining the earnings impacts attributed to the VR program. Critics of applications of the fixed effects model in the case for persons with disabilities note that one of the necessary assumptions is that individual-specific characteristics do not vary with time. Some of the persons applying for VR services, particularly program dropouts, may have disabling conditions that deteriorate with the passage of time which are independent of VR service provision. Others who remain in the program may experience improvement in their functioning that is similarly un-related to the VR service regimen. The concern is that a portion of the earnings gain that the model is attributing to VR “treatment effects” may in fact be due to a “health effect”. If persons are in fact dropping out from VR due to a worsening health condition, such as substance abusers, this will introduce an upward bias in the earnings impacts that will overstate the effect of VR service provision. In a related vein, the choice of the appropriate pre-program baseline period for gauging earnings impacts may be dependent upon the disability.

In order to foster greater confidence in the results it is necessary to undertake a specification of one or more different methodologies for the selection of a comparison group and econometric technique, and then conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis. Tests of choice of base year and various “internal” comparison groups (e.g., screen-outs, withdrawals, as well as drop-outs) have been conducted (and are available from the authors upon request). The results support using the second pre-program year as a base year and program drop-outs (i.e., the VR Status 30 cohort) as the comparison group. The results from using different econometric modeling techniques are currently being conducted.

The second caveat is concerned with sample size considerations that result when stratifying the VR applicants into treatment and comparison groups. Recall, the intent of the paradigm introduced here is to examine the VR program as a series of sub-programs for persons with varying disabilities. While the overall sample sizes presented in the previous tables appear to be large enough, it should be noted that the program dropout comparison group is only about one-seventh of the size of the VR treatment group. The size of three of the comparison groups are quite small after further stratifying these cohorts by gender and disability. Specifically, while there are ample numbers of applicants in FY1988 for persons who dropped out having impairments of musculo-skeletal, internal (cardio-vascular, respiratory illness), mental illness or retardation, there are few dropouts with substance abuse, sensory, or learning disabilities. Earnings impacts and service costs for the latter three cohorts may not be representative. Obtaining consistent benefit-cost ratios for these groups will require possibly combining cohorts across different application years, or perhaps, across different state VR agencies.

The final caveat is that these benefit-cost ratios are based only on the costs of the first VR episode. Recall from the earlier discussion of additional service provision beyond initial closure that more than 1,500 persons — roughly one-third of the treatment group – returned for subsequent VR services. These costs are presented in the aggregate; it still remains to examine such costs at the individual level. In other words, these additional costs have yet to be added in to obtain a total VR service expenditure for each person that includes both the initial and any subsequent VR episodes. Subsequent presentations of the benefit-cost ratios will include the full accounting of purchased VR services.

## Conclusion

This paper develops a new paradigm for measuring the efficacy of the VR program by drawing upon readily-available state agency data bases. The analytical framework compares the costs of “workplace support” services provided by the state VR agency with the net earnings impacts for a treatment cohort of participants with various disabling conditions. This model incorporates several innovative techniques into the evaluative framework. These include collecting longitudinal service cost, economic “environment” measures, and earnings for a cohort of VR applicants in a given annual period. The longitudinal earnings data are important in two respects. The *pre*-program earnings accommodate statistical tests of comparison group validity and thus substantively improves the evaluation framework for gauging VR treatment effects. Further, the seven-year span of *post*-program earnings affords a measure of the sustainability of the program’s impacts. We offer this Virginia analysis as a template for conducting state-level evaluations of VR earnings impacts that is methodologically sound and practical to replicate on a state-by-state basis.

The benefit-cost ratios presented, while preliminary in nature, provide encouraging news about VR efficacy for several different groups of persons with varying disabilities, when contrasted with the employment prospects of a cohort who chose to dropout from the VR program. A subsequent version of the paper will test the sensitivity of these results to the choice of comparison group and econometric model used to estimate earnings impacts, as well as including VR “recidivism” in the cost accounting. These refinements should lend further support to this paradigm for conducting evaluations of the VR program.

The emphasis in this study upon systematic state-level analysis is particularly timely given the current milieu of “new federalism”. Recent trends suggest that federal dollars flowing to the states may come increasingly in the form of block grants. This may be especially pressing for state VR initiatives, since these programs currently receive roughly 80 percent of their funding from federal coffers. Since block grants place greater discretion with state government, it will be increasingly important for legislatures to have state-focused indicators of agency performance in making appropriation decisions.



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